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This paper reviews some of the econometric methods that have been used in the economics of education.
The focus is on understanding how the assumptions made to justify and implement such methods relate
to the underlying economic model and the interpretation of the results. We start by considering the
estimation of the returns to education both within the context of a dynamic discrete choice model inspired
by Willis and Rosen (1979) and in the context of the Mincer model. We discuss the relationship between
the econometric assumptions and economic behaviour. We then discuss methods that have been used
in the context of assessing the impact of education quality, the teacher contribution to pupils' achievement
and the effect of school quality on housing prices. In the process we also provide a summary of some
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31 Introduction
The rising return to schooling and growing evidence in support of education as a
primary determinant of economic growth has elevated the importance and visibility
of research on human capital formation including both the determinants of enrolment
and attainment and the determinants of education quality. Such research must address
complications introduced by the myriad and inter-related decision making processes of
families, teachers, administrators and policy makers. A variety of methods have been
used to identify causal relationships, ranging from structural models based on utility
maximisation to experimental and quasi-experimental approaches, yielding a growing
body of often contradictory evidence.
Although the various approaches differ in the degree to which theoretical models of
decision-making underlay the empirical speciﬁcations, the simple dichotomy between
structural approaches on the one hand and experimental or quasi-experimental on the
other does not hold up in most applications. As we highlight throughout the chapter,
the interpretation, the usefulness and even the identiﬁcation of estimates typically relies
implicitly if not explicitly on a set of assumptions about underlying behaviour. Import-
antly, the introduction of heterogeneity in treatment effects magniﬁes the importance
of such assumptions.
Rather than dividing this chapter by methods, we divide it into two parts largely
in parallel to the division of research on human capital formation into quantity (years
of schooling) and quality. The ﬁrst part focuses on the estimation of wage equations
and the return to schooling, framed by a Roy Model of education decision-making,
originally suggested by Willis and Rosen (1979), that incorporates heterogeneity in re-
turns to schooling across both individuals and three levels of schooling and allows for
comparative advantage in the sense that individuals need not be best at both education
and the labour market. This model not only provides a ﬂexible description of the pro-
cess through which human capital is acquired through schooling, but it also provides a
4framework for discussing the identiﬁcation issues that arise when estimating education
effects on wages with empirical methods not based directly on models that articulate
the full structure of the process of human capital acquisition.
We then turn to the various methods used to estimate education effects on wages,
highlighting the restrictions that must be fulﬁlled in order to generate consistent estim-
ates of the return to schooling. The natural starting point is the estimation of the full
structural model. We describe its estimation based both on maximum likelihood and
on newly developed simulation methods.
Next we describe methods that can be used to estimate Mincer wage equations in
which education is taken to be a continuous variable. First, we discuss approaches to
identiﬁcation under the assumption that the return to schooling is constant both with
respecttotheyearsofeducationandacrossindividuals. Wethenpermitthewagereturn
to schooling to vary with the level of education and discuss the use of non-parametric
IV estimators when the shape of the relationship between wages and years of education
is not known. Next we allow for heterogeneity across individuals and consider general
non-separable models with respect to years of education and unobserved heterogeneity.
This takes us to the frontier of research as far as this class of models is concerned.
Importantly, it becomes clear that identiﬁcation and interpretation of results depends on
the nature of schooling choice. Indeed the implied restrictions on economic behaviour,
required for identiﬁcation are quite stringent and can be interpreted as restrictions on
the information possessed by the individual when making education choices.
Following discussion of the Mincer wage equation we return to the Roy model with
potentially unordered schooling choices and discuss approaches to identiﬁcation of the
effects of education on wages. There we discuss conditions that allow identiﬁcation
“at inﬁnity”, an argument which depends on the availability of enough continuous in-
struments, such that there are sets of values of these instruments where the individuals
facing such values make a choice of a particular education level with probability one.
5In such sets there is no selection. If the instruments are independent of the unobserv-
ables in the wage equation and under some further conditions identiﬁcation is achieved.
However, it is unlikely that such an identiﬁcation strategy has much empirical signi-
ﬁcance. At this point we either need to acknowledge the need for further parametric
assumptions, beyond those implied from theory and beyond the standard IV assump-
tions or we need to resort to set identiﬁcation. In this case we focus on bounding the
distribution of wages for each education group, rather than attempting to obtain point
estimates. The various assumptions used in the point identiﬁcation approach, such as
instrument exclusion can be used here; some can even be relaxed to allow for instru-
ments to shift the distribution of wages in one direction (monotonicity).1 The approach
can be very fruitful, because it provides an intermediate position where a number of
theoretical restrictions are used, making the estimates interpretable within a broad the-
oretical framework, while not using auxiliary assumptions that are both controversial
and do not obtain from theory.
The ﬁnal section of Part I discusses the problem introduced by missing wages for
labour force nonparticipants. We compare a fully structural approach that in practice
will have to rely on assumptions beyond those implied by theory and an approach
based on bounds.2 Allowing for both endogenous education choice and endogenous
labour force participation does make identiﬁcation more stringent. At the same time
bounds are also less informative. Of course ignoring these issues poses serious prob-
lems with interpretation. Identiﬁcation will have to rely on exploiting the restrictions
from theory as well as further assumptions, such as those specifying the distribution of
unobservables. Despite the shortcomings of having to make assumptions that do not
relate directly to theory, the approach that ignores these issues leads to results that have
limited interpretation. Moreover, while most identiﬁcation theorems proposed hitherto
rely on identiﬁcation at inﬁnity arguments, it is possible that further progress can be
1See Manski (1994)
2See Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura and Meghir (2007)
6made by exploiting further restrictions from theory; one possibility is to explore the
use of restrictions from other related decisions. The potential for this can be seen when
comparing the identiﬁcation of pure discrete choice models with those who combine
discrete choice with continuous outcome variables, such as the education and wages
model we discuss.3 Moreover when considering bounds it is clear that identiﬁcation
can obtain without an “identiﬁcation at inﬁnity” argument. Characterising the underly-
ing behavioural conditions for this would be an important advance.
We start the section below by justifying the idea of a Roy model of education and
wages by suggesting that each education level may correspond to a different input in
production, these inputs not being perfectly substitutable for each other. We argued
that in an economy with changing supply of educated workers of differing levels, the
relative wages and the returns to education will change over time. We also refer to
evidence that demonstrates the importance of such considerations. In view of this, we
close this section by discussing the implications or policy of placing education choice
and wages within a general equilibrium framework. A number of authors have shown
that without such a framework it is very difﬁcult to design and think of policy.4 This
again emphasises the need for a model not only for the interpretation of the estimates
but also for understanding what the estimates imply for policy.
Part 2 turns to empirical methods used in research on school and teacher quality.
AlthoughPart2beginswiththepresentationofaneducationproductionfunctionmodel
anddiscussionofthemultiplelevelsofchoicesthatdeterminethematchingofstudents,
teachers, and schools, this model does not provide the unifying framework of the Roy
Model in Part 1. Given the range of issues covered in research on education quality, we
believe it to be more productive to focus on conceptual frameworks tailored to speciﬁc
issues. We do, however, begin Part 2 with general discussions of the housing choice
and the dynamics of the process of knowledge acquisition.
3Contrast Magnac and Thesmar (2002) with Heckman and Navarro (2007) for example.
4See Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998), Lee (2005), Lee and Wolpin (2006) and Gallipoli, Meghir and
Violante (2008).
7We divide Part 2 into four sections corresponding to different research areas that
have received substantial attention in recent years, and within each we juxtapose vari-
ous empirical to estimation. Speciﬁcally, we focus on a small number of papers on
class size, teacher quality, competition and accountability, and capitalisation of school
quality into house prices. The proliferation of administrative and survey data in recent
years has facilitated research on these and other education topics, and we have selected
papers that vary by both type of data and empirical method. The methods include con-
trols for observables, instrumental variables, regression discontinuity as a special case
of IV, use of random lotteries as a special case of IV, difference-in-differences, ﬁxed ef-
fects with large administrative data sets, and the use of data generated by experiments.
As in the ﬁrst section we highlight the inter-relationship among the structure of
underlying choices, treatment effects, identiﬁcation conditions, and meaning of the es-
timates. Estimators differ according to the assumptions required for identiﬁcation and
assumptions concerning the distribution of treatment effects along various dimensions,
though most of these estimators do not come from behavioural models that predict the
structure of treatment effects. Nonetheless, we focus on the inter-dependencies among
underlying behaviour, identiﬁcation conditions and interpretation throughout this dis-
cussion.
In the case of research on class size, we ﬁrst present a model of education pro-
duction based on Lazear (1999) that highlights potential dimensions over which the
beneﬁts of smaller classes might vary and then evaluate a series of different estim-
ators with that framework as a backdrop. In addition to describing the methods and
identifying assumptions, this compares estimators according to the degree to which
they capture class size related general equilibrium effects on the quality of instruction;
some estimators capture cross-sectional differences in teacher quality associated with
smaller classes, some capture changes over time in state average teacher quality, while
others isolate the ceteris paribus effect of smaller classes.
8The description of research on the semi-parametric estimation of the variance in
teacher quality begins with a discussion of the behavioural responses of families, teach-
ers, and administrators that complicate estimation. It then describes different ap-
proaches to estimation of the variance and to accounting for sorting both between and
within schools.
The discussion of research on housing market capitalisation focuses narrowly on
boundary ﬁxed effects estimators (see Chapter # for a comprehensive treatment of this
issue). Twoofthethreepapersadoptreducedformapproaches, whilethethirddevelops
a discreet choice framework with which to model housing choice and heterogeneity in
the preferences for both school quality and peer characteristics.
The papers on choice and accountability examine different types of incentives in-
cluding competition from public and private schools and state accountability systems.
Non-random family take-up of choice options complicates estimation of choice effects,
while the non-random distribution of accountability system adoption date and charac-
ter complicate efforts to identify accountability system impacts. Each paper takes a
different approach to account for unobserved differences across families and states.
The chapter concludes with a synthesis of the key commonalities and differences
between work on the return to schooling and on school quality and the ways in which
the proliferation of administrative and survey data affect the structure of empirical ana-
lyses. It highlights remaining challenges and areas for additional work.
2 Wage equations and the returns to education
The aim of this section is to discuss the estimation of the returns to education. We place
wages and education choice within a simple competitive general equilibrium frame-
work. In this model forward looking individuals choose an education level; each level
is associated with its own wage process. The allows us to clarify the notion of returns
to education and to discuss clearly identiﬁcation issues. Once we have deﬁned the
9model of education choice and wages we digress to the simpler world of Mincer wage
equations and discuss identiﬁcation issues within that context. In a simple version of
that model, as shown by Mincer (1958, 1974), the returns to education can be estim-
ated directly from the relationship of wages and education, because the only cost to
education is the opportunity cost - there are no direct costs such as fees. Moreover in
many contexts we may be interested in the impact of education on wages in and of it-
self. Following the discussion of identiﬁcation of Mincer type models we return to the
identiﬁcation issues of the dynamic model we originally introduced. One of the main
themes of this section will be the extent to which we can interpret estimates on the
wage returns to education without saying much about the process of education choice.
2.1 Pricing of human capital
Our starting point is that production involves k types of human capital; the type of
human capital that an individual possesses is determined by the level of education they
have attained. Here the levels considered will be statutory schooling, high school and
college. The wage received by an individual will we the product of the aggregate
price of her type of human capital (Wkt) with the amount she brings to the market
(hkit), say wkit = Wkthkit, where k denotes the type of human capital and hkit is the
amount in efﬁciency units that individual i possesses in time periodt.5 The literature on
modelling wages concentrates on understanding how to model the constituents of hkit,
which will be a function of education, ability and possibly experience, age and other
factors that enhance individual productivity and skills. Thus the returns to education in
a competitive economy will depend both on how each education level is priced in the
market (i.e. how Wkt is determined) and how education contributes to the formation of
hkit. The way pricing may change in the future is a source of aggregate uncertainty,
5See for example Heckman, Layne-Farrar and Todd (1996).
10while possible future shocks to human capital hkit will be a source of idiosyncratic
uncertainty.
Consider ﬁrst pricing in a competitive market. Suppose there are three levels of
education: less than high school (SL), high school (SH) and college (SC). Now suppose












with δi > 0, δC +δH +δS = 1, ρ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and Hjt is the sum of total human
capital employed of type j in period t. In efﬁciency units this is Hjt = ∑
N
i=1hkit, where












Thus the relative prices of the two types of human capital will vary depending on the
ratio of demands
Hj
HS, so long as ρ <1. The source of aggregate uncertainty are changes
in the relative value of the δs, such as skill biased technical change. When ρ = 1
the inputs are perfectly substitutable and the relative prices are invariant to changes
in
Hj
HS. The relative pay can change however in response to changes in technology
as expressed by changes in
δj
δk. The resulting wage equation for individual i who has
obtained educational level k can then be represented as
lnwkit = lnWkt +lnhkit (2)
When ρ = 1, and with no changes in technology this simpliﬁes to
lnwit = lnWt +lnhit (3)
which is now common across education groups. Wage equations based on years of
11education only, without regard to the type of education received can be interpreted
through, and is inspired by the work of Mincer.



















Hst . These can be obtained as fol-
lows. First we estimate wage equations for each level of schooling. The time dummies
in the equations for level S is a measure (up to an additive constant) of logWSt. an
estimate of individual human capital can then be obtained by using the relationship
hkit = exp(logwkit −logWkt)
Aggregating the estimate of this quantity and assuming the sample is representative (or
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by the total number of people of these two skill levels, whether
they are working or not. This uses the medium term availability of the resource as the
instrument. An alternative would be to use dynamics, i.e. lags in human capital as
instruments.
The empirical evidence suggests that ρ <1 and hence that different levels of human
capital are not perfectly substitutable. Katz and Murphy (1992) and Heckman, Lochner
and Taber (1998) both estimate the elasticity of substitution ( 1
1−ρ) between unskilled
and skilled workers to be about 1.4, although alternative estimates suggest even lower
values. Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (2008) estimate the elasticity of substitution
between statutory schooling, high school and college for the US using instrumental
variables. They ﬁnd that the same elasticity of substitution can be imposed across all
12pairwise comparisons; they estimate this to be between 1.5 and 2.6. It is safe to say that
the consensus in the literature is that different types of human capital are not perfectly
substitutable for each other.
2.2 A model of education choice and wages
Given the discussion above it follows that we should model education as choosing a
speciﬁc level; we should then estimate lifecycle wage proﬁles within each sector. This
is similar to the Roy (1951) model and the empirical basis for this has been formulated
by Willis and Rosen (1979). Keane and Wolpin (1997) have taken this further, allowing
also for occupational choice and modelling the entire career.7
This model provides a framework for estimating the returns to education and dis-
cussing the identiﬁcation issues that arise when we attempt to estimate the wage returns
with simpler methods and without articulating the entire structure of the model. Indeed
we will argue that the identiﬁcation of wage returns to education are intricately linked
with the underlying model of education choice and that in most cases these cannot be
separated.
Consider an individual who has just completed statutory schooling and will decide
on completing high school and then on whether to complete college. We will take
these as two sequential decisions, to which the individual needs to commit success-
ively. Once schooling is over the individual works and earns depending on the level of
6They consider less than high school, high school, some college and college. They could not reject the
restriction of one elasticity of substitution.
7Variations of this model have been used by Attanasio, Meghir and Santiago (2009) where only the
discrete education choice is modelled and Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (2008) who model educational
choice, wages, labour supply and intergenerational transfers. Heckman and Navarro (2007) use a version of
this model to analyse identiﬁability of returns to education and of the dynamic discrete choice models.














where eH and eC represent the additional years of schooling, over and above the stat-
utory ones needed to obtain a high school and college degree respectively and where Xi
are observable characteristics that inﬂuence individual earnings. It would be straight-
forward to include age and other time varying characteristics so long as we made the
assumption of perfect foresight. At a later section we show how the model can be
generalised to include endogenous experience and nonparticipation. We have abstrac-
ted from the aggregate ﬂuctuations in the prices of human capital, but in this simple
environment allowing for aggregate shocks is relatively straightforward.
These earnings functions include a number of important features: ﬁrst earnings
growth with respect to potential experience, i.e. age minus years of education differ
depending on the level of education, allowing for the possibility of complementarity




i ). This implies heterogeneous returns to education, with respect
to unobservables (as well as possibly through observables). We will assume here that
this heterogeneity is in the individual’s information set when making the education
choice. This assumption is not innocuous and does affect the way we estimate the
model. Third, the stochastic structure of earnings will differ across groups. For ex-
ample the variance or persistence of shocks may differ depending on the chosen sector.
This is particularly important when considering models that allow for risk aversion.
The model has abstracted from other important issues, such as endogenous experience
14and non-participation.
Now consider the ﬂow of utility. We assume that individuals incur observable mon-
etary costs κH(ZH) and κC(ZC) for high school and college, respectively. These will
include fees, cost of books, transport costs etc. and may depend on observable charac-
teristics Zi = {ZH
i ,ZC
i }. Individuals will also incur unobservable costs per unit of time
spent in education, which we can interpreted as effort. These we will assume are het-
erogeneous and we denote them by Fi. Taking all this into account the ﬂow utility for










where the coefﬁcient α reﬂects the fact that effort and time spent in college can be
different than in high school and where the vH and vC represent random shocks to the
costs of education. The high school utility vH
i shock is revealed when the individual
needs to decide to go to high school or start working. Similarly the college shock is
revealed after high school when the college decision needs to be made. The assumed
timing of such shocks is critical for the model: the fact they are revealed sequentially,
implies that the decision to continue to the next level will include an option value to
continue further; thus as we shall see, attending high school has value for the earnings
that are expected and because of the option of attending college, whose value will
depend on the shock that has not been realised yet. We will simplify the model further
by assuming that once the individual has dropped out of the formal education system
they no longer can return and they work until a ﬁxed retirement age of say 60. In a more
detailed model we would allow for endogenous retirement or at least the recognition
that retirement age differs by education group and is probably higher for the more
educated. The expected utility from working having achieved education level S, H or



























i )AC(Xi) College Earnings
(7)








, J = S, H,
C, with ei being the age at which education level i is completed. The expectation is
taken over future wage shocks. Now consider the decision process for someone who
just completed statutory schooling. The value of attending high school will be given
by the sum of the current costs of schooling (uH
i ) and the option value of either going
to college or starting work as a high school graduate. Thus the value of attending high













where the expectation is over all future wage shocks and the shock to the cost of at-
tending college vC









16The ﬁrst decision is to attend high school or not. The decision rule is
Attend High School ⇐⇒ VH
i >VS
i (8)
If the individual does not attend high school then they enter the labour market until
retirement. If they do attend, in the next period they need to decide whether to continue
with college. The decision rule is again
Attend College ⇐⇒ VC
i >VWH
i . (9)
At the point of making the education decision the individual is assumed to know the




i . They also know the costs of education (both direct and
effort costs). Interestingly, this model allows for comparative advantage (as in Willis
and Rosen, 1979)) in the sense that individuals need not be best at both education and
the labour market: they may be very good at the medium skill labour market (high τH
i )
and not so good at education (low Fi) or perhaps a negative αFi. Thus both the mech-
anism of selection into different education levels and the resulting relationship between
education and unobserved components of wages are complex and not necessarily in an
easy to predict direction.
To estimate the model or use it for simulations we must ﬁrst solve it, i.e. compute
expressions for the value functions that will allow us to implement the decision rules 8
and 9. In the context of this particularly simple model this is easy to do, but in more
complex models it can be computationally time consuming.
Given a set of parameters and given the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
the discounted value of further schooling and/or work can be computed by projecting










The next step involves a conditional expectation with respect to the distribution of the




In a parametric context these could be assumed normal for example; since the decision
is discrete we normalise the variance to be one. The distribution is ﬁrst needed to write
down the expected value function for the next period, which involves the future optimal
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￿






it and ˜ VC
i .
Given a wage equation and a discount factor we can easily compute ˜ VWH
i , which is the
present discounted value of mean earnings.
In a model that is linear in earnings the value beyond working life can be set to zero,
without loss of generality. However, a practical difﬁculty is that we may be missing
wages for older individuals, during working life and this needs to be accounted for.
Suppose we observe individuals up to some age (it could differ across individuals).
Then we either need to assume how earnings will evolve beyond that age or we need
to introduce a terminal value function whose parameters will be estimated alongside
the remaining parameters of the model. If we have enough data to estimate the age-
earningsproﬁleonlyuptoaspeciﬁcageT theterminalvaluefunctionwillbeafunction
of the state variables at that age as well as of observed Xi and unobserved characteristics
18unobserved heterogeneity. In our simple model the state is just the education level .





i ) for J = S,H,C (10)












it is the expected wage conditional on unobserved heterogeneity τJ . Thus now
for a given set of parameters, we can compute all future values required to construct
the probability of attaining a particular level of education, conditional on τ.
The average lifecycle returns to college vis a vis high school from the perspective







both the wage gains of going to college over the lifecycle as well as accounting for the
individual direct and opportunity costs of education. This measure will allow for the
effects of education on other dimensions of behaviour, such as expected endogenous
and exogenous spells out of work, which can be elements of more complex models.8
In this model the returns to education are heterogeneous, depending on the unob-
served components of wages and educational costs. The individual wage returns to
8see for example Adda, Dustmann, Meghir and Robin (2009)








Since the wage returns9 to education are heterogeneous in this model there are
many different concepts of such returns.10 The average wage return to one level of














ATT (age,Zi,Xi,L,L￿) ≡ E(lnwL
i −lnwL￿






i |age,Zi,Xi,Ji = L)−E(τL￿
i |age,Zi,Xi,Ji = L)
￿
(11)
Note that in 11 the last expression is the average labour market ability relating to high
school education for those who chose to attend college. In all cases, estimation of the
returns of interest (e.g. ATE or ATT or the entire distribution) will require estimating
some aspect at least of the distribution of the τJ. Just to emphasise this point, if we
ignore this issue and we just compare wages across sectors the estimate of the returns
9Henceforth we will refer loosely to the "returns to education" as the effect of education on wages.
10See Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999)












i |age,Zi,Xi,Ji = L)−E(τL￿
i |age,Zi,Xi,Ji = L￿)
￿
.
While the ﬁrst term in square brackets is indeed ∆
L/L￿
ATE (age) and reﬂects the gains ob-
tained as a result of attending college over high school, the term in {} brackets rep-
resents the differences in composition between the two groups. This differs from the
expression is the square brackets in 11, which represents the average ability for edu-
cation level L of those who chose L minus the average ability for level L￿ of the same
group of individuals, i.e. those who chose L.
2.3 Estimation
The model described above has left a number of objects unspeciﬁed. These include
the functional forms for the direct costs of schooling κJ(ZJ
i ), J = H,C, the functional
form for the wage equations and the distribution of preferences and wages induced





i , ). The identiﬁability of such a
model is an important point of discussion. Indeed Magnac and Thesmar (2002) have
shown that the discrete choice model, without any direct link to outcomes such as
wages is underidentiﬁed.11 In their context they prove that we can identify the static
utilities (here direct costs of education) if we ﬁx the discount rate, the distribution of
preferences and the utility of a reference choice. The implication is that in a discrete
choice model forward looking dynamics have little empirical content; for example we
cannot distinguish nonparametrically between a forward looking model and a static one
(discount rate zero) without further restrictions. However, this framework is perhaps
11See also Rust (1994)
21asking too much from the data and it is perhaps not too surprising that with just discrete
decisions and no other restrictions we cannot identify much. Heckman and Navarro
(2007) argue that using the cross equation restrictions between educational choice and
wages, as implied by a model where educational choices depend on labour market
gains, and putting some (factor) structure on the distribution of unobservables is crucial
for identiﬁcation, although not sufﬁcient. We discuss these identiﬁcation issues below.
Here we address estimation in a fully parametric context. That is we specify all missing
functional forms, including the distribution of unobservables, up to an unknown ﬁnite
set parameters.
There are numerous ways to implement estimation; for particularly complex mod-
elsanumberofsimulationapproacheshavebeendeveloped, includingsimulatedmethod
of moments and indirect inference.12 Here we describe maximum likelihood because
the model we presented is relatively simple. We brieﬂy discuss the implementation of
simulation estimators for this type of model below.
The estimation approach suggested by Rust (1987), known as Nested Fixed Point
(NFP) algorithm involves starting at some initial parameter vector; solving the model
to obtain the future value functions VC,VWH
i at all possible values of observables and
unobservables; followed by the evaluation of the the likelihood function. Once this is
evaluated at the parameter vector an update of the parameters can be found based on
a suitable optimisation algorithm, such as Gauss-Newton; when the updated parameter
vector has been obtained the process starts again with the solution of the model and
so on until convergence. The model will also have to be solved in intermediate steps
so as to be able to compute the derivatives of the likelihood during the Gauss Newton
iterative process or other derivative based method. It is thus crucial to solve the model
in a computationally efﬁcient way.
Su and Judd (2008) note than in many cases the NFP algorithm can become ex-
12See McFadden (1989), Pakes and Pollard (1989) and Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault (1993) amongst
others.
22tremely time consuming and possibly infeasible because of the huge number of times
it needs to solve the full dynamic programming problem. They propose an alternative
approach based on mathematical programming subject to equilibrium constraints that
simultaneously solves for the value function and estimates the parameters θ. Effect-
ively, they treat the unknown value functions as parameters to be estimated and deﬁne
the link between the value functions and the structural parameters as a set of nonlinear
constraints on the parameters. Once set up in this way any standard optimisation al-
gorithm can be used. They ﬁnd one obtains both speed and accuracy gain in the Rust
type problem.
To see how the model can be solved we start by constructing the probabilities of
educational attainment conditional on unobserved heterogeneity.
a. An individual is observed having just statutory education. They are then ob-
















from work at this level of qualiﬁcation, as well as on the beneﬁts of continuing educa-
tion into college, which is expressed as a comparison between the beneﬁts of college
and the stream of future incomes from high school. Interestingly, even if the beneﬁts
from high school may be low for a particular individual, because say τH
i happens to be
very low they may still choose to attend high school because their beneﬁts from college
may be very high. This illustrates why ﬁnal educational attainment cannot in general
be represented as an ordered discrete choice regression model, which will have implic-
ations below for the identiﬁcation and estimation of the wage returns to education.13
From an economic point of view this highlights the notion that each education level
13See Cameron and Heckman (1998)
23may represent a different sector and individuals may have a comparative advantage for
a more advanced sector, without being particularly good at the intermediate level.
Now consider what is the probability of observing someone completing high school
and then going on to work. They prefer to continue after statutory schooling and stop
after high school. To write down the probability of this event we will assume that the
schooling shocks vJ, J = S,H,C are independent over time and that all the depend-
ence in the sequential decisions comes from Fi. Then the probability of high school
completion with no further college is
PH





































































This sequence of probabilities also illustrates the way that the distribution of character-
istics (observable and unobservable) evolve as individuals progress through schooling:
all else being equal individuals with the lowest values of F are the ﬁrst to stop school.
The selection that happens next very much depends on the relative importance of effort
costs F for high school and college. If F is more important for high school than college
(α < 1) then individuals with the highest values of F will actually drop out and not go
24to college. If on the other hand effort is more important for college, the persons with
highest value of F will complete college and then enter the labour market.
Now suppose we observe earnings for an individual over Ti periods. The key com-
plexity here relates to the stochastic structure of earnings, i.e. the way that the error
terms ε evolve over time. In this context we will deal with the simplest case where
the ε are all independently and identically distributed over time. However, other more
realistic assumptions in the literature include cases where the ε are a random walk or
have an autoregressive structure.14
We suppose that observations on earnings start immediately after full time edu-
cation is completed. Thus if t = 1 for the ﬁrst observation of someone who started
working following statutory schooling, t = eH +1 for someone with a high school de-
gree and t = eC +1 for someone with college. With i.i.d. errors the density of the






gJ(wi|t −ei, Xi, τ
Ji
i ) (15)
where Ji is the level of education achieved, gJ is the density of wages for those with
education J, and θ is the vector of parameters. Putting all the pieces together the like-
lihood function for an individual who has followed education stream J and is observed




All probabilities and wages depend on unobserved heterogeneity components. The
distribution of unobservables needs to be estimated together with the rest of the para-
meters. The model includes four unobservables, namely τi =(τS
i , τH
i , τC
i ), and F which
14Adda et al. (2009) allow for a within ﬁrm random walk.
25need to be integrated out. Integrating out the unobserved heterogeneity implies that
we average over all possible values, using as weights the probability of each possible
value. The weights, as well as the possible values of unobserved heterogeneity consti-








where G(F,τ) is the four dimensional distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. Note
that we are allowing for correlation between the factors.
A key complication in practice is that such high dimensional integrals can take a
longtimetocomputeandwhilethislevelofgeneralityisveryattractive, inthatitallows
very general sorting patterns into different education groups, the computational difﬁ-
culty could make the whole problem prohibitive, particularly in the context of richer
and more complex models including other decisions such as labour supply.
We can keep some of the advantages of the original speciﬁcation and simplify the
problem substantially by assuming that there are just two factors, one that enters edu-
cation as before (F) and one that enters wages (τ). The effect of the unobservable in
each of the wages is controlled for by a coefﬁcient αJ (J = H, C). The coefﬁcient on
the wages for statutory schooling is normalised to one since τ is not observed.
Whatever the speciﬁcs of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, the sample













The estimation problem relates to obtaining estimates for the unknown parameters θ
and the distribution G(F,τ) by maximising LogL in 17.
262.3.1 Estimation by simulation
Many structural models are often too complex to estimate based on Maximum Likeli-
hood. Since the seminal work of Lerman and Manski (1981), McFadden (1989) and
Pakes and Pollard (1989) simulation approaches and in particular simulated methods
of moments have offered a useful alternative that allow us to approach much more
complex models.
The ﬁrst step in simulated method of moments is to decide on a set of moments that
can identify the parameters on the model. In our education choice model the propor-
tions attending each level of education, mean wages and variance of wages by educa-
tion, all conditional on the exogenous variables would be suitable moments. These can
be estimated directly from the data. Denote these by ˆ q. Given a value for the parameter
vector θ,which includes the distribution of unobservables we can simulate education
choices and lifecycle proﬁles of wages from the model. The same moments that were
estimated from the data can now be constructed from the simulated data. Denote these
simulated moments by qs(θ), where s denotes the number of simulations. An estimate
of the covariance matrix of the estimated moments is ˆ Ω. Then the simulated method of
moments minimises the function
Q(D|θ)=(ˆ q−qs(θ))￿ ˆ Ω−1(ˆ q−qs(θ)) (18)
with respect to θ, where D is the data used to compute the moments Precision will
improve with the number of simulations S used to compute qs(θ) as well as with the
degree of overidentiﬁcation, i.e. the number of moments over and above those needed
to exactly identify the model.
A note of caution is called for: while maximum likelihood uses all the information
and restrictions implied by the model, given the available data, method of moments do
not. In linear models it is easy to see what moments identify the model; however in
27highly nonlinear models choosing the set of moments that can identify the model may
be difﬁcult in practice. Moreover it is complicated if not intractable to check formally
that the chosen moments identify the model: this would involve checking that the 2nd
derivative matrix of the criterion function is negative deﬁnite around the optimum.
Thus the cost of moving away from maximum likelihood is the lack of clear rules for
choosing the right moments to match.
Returning to the estimation problem, if the criterion function 18 is smooth then
a derivative based method, such as Gauss Newton is appropriate. This may not be
always the case. Recently Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) have offered an estimation
approach that borrows from Bayesian estimation methods and is particularly suitable
forcomplexproblemsandnon-smoothcriteriafunctions. BorrowingfromtheBayesian
literature they deﬁne the “quasi posterior” distribution of the parameters as
gN(θ|D) ∝ exp(−NQ(D|θ))π(θ) (19)
where π(θ) is a suitable prior. Asymptotically the prior will not matter, but in any ﬁxed
sample the choice will affect the parameter estimates. The key result by Chernozhukov
and Hong (2003) is that if we draw a sample of parameters θ(k) from gN(θ|D), where
k denotes one random draw, then the sample mean of the {θ(k),k = 1,K} converges
asymptotically to θ. To draw random vectors from gN(θ|D) we can use Markov
Chain Monte Carlo methods (Chib, 2001). This works as follows: guess an initial
value for θ, say θ(0), solve and simulate the model and compute the corresponding
exp(−NQ(D|θ))π(θ), which is gN(θ(0)|D) up to an unknown constant of integration.
Now deﬁne an update of θ by
θ(k+1) = θ(k)+η (20)
where η is a random vector drawn from a distribution such that it respects any con-
28straints on the parameter space. For example, for parameters that cover the entire real
line η could be normal with some variance to be chosen by us and modiﬁed as the
sampling proceeds until we reach a stationary distribution. Once the stationary distri-
bution has been reached the sampling needs to remain the same.15 We thus proceed
as follows: compute the value of gN(θ(k+1)|D). The next element of the sample space
that we will keep is





Note that the constant of integration cancels out from 21 and hence never needs to
be computed. This algorithm leads to a sample drown from gN(θ|D). The estimator
is then the average of the draws from the stationary distribution and the conﬁdence
intervals can be obtained directly from the quantiles of the sampled parameters. This
approach can work well, even if the criterion function Q(D|θ) is not smooth because
no derivatives are required.
Overall simulation methods require programming the solution of the model and our
ability to simulate it but do not require the computation of an often intractable likeli-
hood function. Such approaches promise to give a fresh impetus to the use of structural
models. This is particularly important because as we shall see most methods that look
simpler rely implicitly for their interpretation on particularly strong assumptions about
individual behaviour.
15For implementation details of Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods see Robert and Casella (1999)
292.4 EstimatingtheWageReturnstoeducationinMincerwageequa-
tions
Most of the work on the returns to education has not followed the approach described
above; rather it has used the framework of the Mincer equations where educational at-
tainment is summarised by years of education. Thus we digress to discuss the methods
used that are based on years of education. The theoretical foundations for such a model
can be found in the work of Mincer (1958, 1974). Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003)
have an excellent analysis of the theoretical foundations of the Mincer wage equation
and on its empirical relevance.
The key differences in the underlying choice model that leads to the Mincer equa-
tion is the absence of direct costs of education and the absence of any uncertainty when
education choice is made. Moreover, education is seen as enhancing human capital but
not changing its nature: different education levels are perfectly substitutable for each
other. The basic Mincer equation can be written as
lnwit = at +bsi+cxit +dx2
it +uit (22)
where si represents the years of schooling and xit represents years of actual work ex-
perience. This relationship is derived in Mincer (1974) and results from pre-labour
market investments in schooling and post school training. In the simplest form of the
Mincer model, where there are no direct costs of schooling, but only an opportunity
cost, and no heterogeneity in discount rates, the coefﬁcient on schooling is the return
to education and will be equal to the interest rate. However, in more complex models,
where there are direct costs and possibly heterogeneity in discount rates and in costs,
this is no longer true. So the ﬁrst (well known) point is that in general just using a wage
equation does not provide us with enough information to estimate the return to educa-
tion, but just the educational premium for wages; this is just part of the story. In what
30follows, we refer to the wage return to education as the effect of extra education on
wages earned, rather than the full return, which would include a complete accounting
of the costs and beneﬁts.16
Relaxing a number of assumptions underlying the Mincer model we can end up
with a relationship that is both nonlinear in education and where the returns differ
across individuals. Perhaps the easiest way of justifying this equation is via the human
capital production function, which can take a variety of functional forms and then price
out human capital by the equilibrium in the labour market.
We can simplify the problem by replacing actual experience (the number of periods
worked) and including potential experience (Ageit −si) in a linear fashion to start with.
We will also abstract from all other relevant observable characteristics and we will drop
the time subscript. However we will allow the baseline wage to be different across
individuals by specifying that a depends on individual i (ai) due to unobserved labour
market ability. Thus we get
lnwi = a+bsi+cAge+[ai−a]
If differences in ability are known at the time the individual makes educational choices
and are taken into account by them, the years of education will depend on them and
be endogenous.17 This means that E[ai−a|si]=q(si) where q(si) is some non-trivial
function of schooling s. In this simple framework, suppose we have a variable zi which
satisﬁes the rank condition E(si|zi) ￿= 0 (correlated with education) and the exclusion






16The Mincer equation can also be viewed as a restrictive version of the Roy model, where the unobserv-
ables are the same across education groups.
17see Griliches (1977a,b) for one of the ﬁrst and comprehensive discussions of the role of ability in wage
equations.
31which can be implemented by replacing the numerator with the sample covariance of
z and log wages and the denominator by the sample covariance between z and years of
schooling. The resulting estimator is consistent, i.e. converges to the true value b as
the sample tends to inﬁnity, under the stated conditions.
Of course the key difﬁculty is ﬁnding variables that somehow affect schooling and
do not affect wages. Because of the linearity of the relationship our task is made easier:
even a binary instrumental variable would be sufﬁcient to estimate b. An obvious pos-
sibility is to use variables that reﬂect the cost of schooling when the individual was
making these decisions. The key problem of course is that such cost related variables
may also be related to the future productivity of the individual when they enter the
labour market. A number of variables have been used in the literature in this respect.
For example, Card (1995) discusses the use of distance from school as an instrument,
which reﬂects both time and money costs of schooling. While this is clearly a cost re-
lated variable and is correlated with schooling it may also be correlated with individual
ability. This is because individuals and schools are unlikely to be randomly allocated.18
An example is individuals living in a city tend to be higher ability and probably more
dynamic and ambitious. At the same time the increased population density will mean
that schools are on average closer to individuals.
Other instruments relate to changes in legislation. Prominent examples include
the use of changes in compulsory schooling laws by Harmon and Walker (1995). They
exploit the fact that compulsory schooling increased twice in the UK, from 14 to 15 and
then from 15 to 16. However, because their estimation involves comparing outcomes
across successive cohorts, they are not able to allow for other confounding factors
that may inﬂuence productivity and the returns to experience of each of the successive
cohorts.
Meghir and Palme (2005) directly evaluate the impact of an educational reform
that increases compulsory schooling and abolishes early streaming at 12 years of age.
18see also Card (2001) on this point.
32In their case they are able to exploit the fact that the reform was introduced gradu-
ally across different municipalities in Sweden, which meant that at the same point in
time there were municipalities operating different school systems and whose workers
would eventually end up in the same labour market. This implied that they could com-
pare across cohorts living in municipalities that switched education system between
the cohorts to those living in municipalities that kept the old system for both cohorts
(or indeed who were in the new system for both cohorts). The results showed clear
beneﬁts for individuals from lower socioeconomic groups both in terms of educational
attainment and wages; for those from higher socioeconomic groups there was no effect
of education but an adverse effect on their earnings over the lifecycle. Indeed the nature
and scope of the reforms were such that we would expect them to affect wages directly
as well as possibly through years of education. Hence in this case the reform does not
provide a valid instrument for the returns to education, but can be evaluated as a policy
in itself.19
This brings up an important point of general interest: it is often the case that reforms
are used as instruments for estimating returns to education. However, if the reforms
changed other aspects of education, such as its quality, it is no longer an excludable in-
strument for the quantity of education. The reforms to the number of compulsory years
of schooling are a strong case at point: if we increase the number of compulsory years
of schooling we may change both the peer group of those who would have continued
anyway and possibly the pupil teacher ratio. And if we do increase the resources we
will change the composition of the secondary teacher population, all of which can have
a direct effect on wages. In most plausible cases the reform will not be excludable from
the wage equation a priori.
Angrist and Krueger (1991) use the quarter of birth of an individual an instrument
for education in a wage equation. Quarter of birth interacts with the laws on compuls-
19It did however, allow inferences to be made on the effects of streaming on groups whose socioeconomic
background was such that their educational attainment could not be affected by the change in the compulsory
schooling laws.
33ory schooling to generate differences among individuals who happen to have been born
on different dates: the reason this instrument may explain differences in the amount of
schooling received is because one can drop out of school on their 16th birthday; hence
depending on the month of birth some individuals have effectively fewer months of
compulsory schooling than others. Interestingly this instrument acts at the individual
level and does not affect aggregate schooling, as do reforms to the schooling laws men-
tioned above. Angrist and Krueger show that there are differences in total schooling by
month of birth. However, the differences are small and this particular study led to the
important literature on the effects of using instruments that are only weakly correlated
with the variable to be instrumented (here schooling). One of the conclusions of this
literature is that when an instrument is weak the estimated results are biased towards
OLS (see Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995 and Steiger and Stock, 1997). A further issue
with quarter of birth is whether it is excludable as an instrument from the wage equa-
tion: children born in different quarters start attending school at different ages, which
may well have an impact on their performance. The effect may be small, but it has to
be compared with the small effect that quarter of birth has on attained schooling.
In a interesting paper Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) combine compulsory school-
ing reforms as instruments that change both the individual level of education and the
aggregate one with quarter of birth, that changes only individual decisions but have
no aggregate effect. Their purpose is to distinguish between the private and the social
returns to education; this brings to the fore the issues we discussed earlier: reforms to
compulsory schooling laws affect directly those individuals who would have dropped
out anyway. However, because they increase education for a number of people at the
same time they change the composition and amount of educated individuals in the state.
If education has externalities, i.e. social returns over and above the private ones, then
using reforms as an instrument should pick up these effects; the estimated returns to
education will be different from those measured by an instrument that “varied” indi-
34vidual levels of education but not the aggregate. Indeed they will be larger if education
has positive external effects. To measure the contribution of the external effects they
then use quarter of birth instruments to identify the private returns as in Angrist and
Krueger (1991). The difference of the two estimates should be the externality effect of
education. However, if the reforms also affect the quality of education and equilibrium
returns the estimates obtained with the reforms will be confounded by GE effects and
quality differences. A further issue arises if returns to education are heterogeneous
because, even under the monotonicity assumption the instruments may be measuring
the returns corresponding to different types of individuals. Moreover, with GE and
peer effects monotonicity may no longer be valid . In general it is particularly difﬁcult
to ﬁnd satisfactory instruments for education returns without embedding the problem
within the a structural model, which allows us to account for such confounding factors.
2.4.1 Nonparametric Models
When the wage returns to education are not constant but depend on education, as would
be the case if the effect of schooling on wages were nonlinear, the instrumental vari-
ables approach becomes more demanding. Dropping age for notational simplicity, a
general way of describing the problem is through the following model
lnwi = b(si)+ui (24)
where now b(si) is some unknown function, and education may be endogenous. The
econometric problem of using instrumental variables in this nonparametric context has
been addressed by Newey and Powell (2003) and Darolles, Florens and Renault (2000).
The estimator is deﬁned based on the assumption that E(u|Z)=0 as in the usual linear
instrumental variables context. This restriction means that the error term u is mean
independent of any nonlinear function of z. However, this is not sufﬁcient: we also
35need a suitable rank condition. Thus in this regard Newey and Powell (2003) introduce
the critical rank condition that any function of education δ(s) can be predicted by Z.
To restate their proposition 2.1:
[Proposition 2.1, Newey and Powell (2003) page 1567] If E(u|Z)=0 then b(s) in
24 is identiﬁed if and only if for all δ(s) with ﬁnite expectation E(δ(s)|Z)=0 implies
δ(s)=0.
The importance of this result lies in its implications (or requirements) for identiﬁc-
ation. The practical difﬁculty is ﬁnding instruments that can satisfy these conditions:
the rank condition is much more demanding than the equivalent one in a linear con-
text because it requires that the instrument can produce predictions of any nonlinear
function of education and that all these predictions are full rank. However, the prac-
tical importance of this theorem lies in what it tells us about the identiﬁability of such
general nonlinear relationships.
Suppose we do have an instrument satisfying the conditions, we now brieﬂy de-
scribe implementing an estimator for the function b(si). To understand how the non-
parametric estimator works we will start with the simple case where the education
variable takes K distinct values (1 year to 22 years say) and we have an instrument
Z which takes M distinct values; imagine this as reﬂecting discrete costs of schooling.
Theexclusionrestrictioneffectivelyimpliesthatthevaluesofthisinstrumenthavebeen
randomly allocated to individuals20. Since si takes K discrete values, g(si) also takes K
discrete values. The exclusion restriction implies that (lnw−b(S)|Z = zj)=0.21 This
implies the following set of equations
E(lnw|Z = zj)=E(b(S)|Z = zj) j = 1,...,M (25)
This represents a system of M equations with K unknowns. For example the ﬁrst
20The theory requires the instrument just to be mean independent of the residuals, conditional on other
observable characteristics. Hence the assumptions are weaker than complete randomisation that indices full
independence.
21We use a capital to denote a random variable and a lower case to denote a speciﬁc realisation.
36equation will have the form
E(lnw|Z = z1)=Σkb(S = sk)Pr(S = sk|Z = z1)
For this system of equations to have a unique solution for the K unknowns b(S = sk),
k = 1,...,K, we need the matrix whose (j,k) element is Pr(S = sk|Z = zj) to have rank
K. This means that the instrument has to take at least K values and that the probab-
ility of different levels of schooling vary sufﬁciently with the instrument. This rank
condition is the discrete analog of the Newey and Powell condition.
To implement this deﬁne the sample average logw when the instrument takes the








, where 1(Zi =
zj) is one whenever in the sample the instrument take the value zj and Nj is the number
of such sample points. Denote by pkj = Pr(S = sk|Z = z1) and by ˆ pkj the sample





bk ˆ pkj j = 1,...,M (26)
where bk =b(S =sk) is the set of k unknown values. Estimating g then involves simply
solving the system of equations in 26. For the exact identiﬁcation case (M = K) this
simply means
ˆ g = ˆ P−1¯ y (27)
where ˆ g is the K ×1 vector of all ˆ gks and ˆ P is the K ×K matrix of probabilities of
the ˆ pkj. For the overidentiﬁed case (M > K and rank(P)=K) the estimator of gk would
minimise the distance
D(g)=(¯ y−Pg)￿Ω−1(¯ y−Pg)
with respect to the vector g. In the above Ω is a suitable covariance matrix.
Extending this procedure to the continuous education case, involves solving an "ill-
37posed inverse" problem, where in general the matrix ˆ P in 27 is not invertible in ﬁnite
samples. The approach to solving this is called regularisation, which involves adding a
component to P so that it becomes invertible, for example replacing P by P∗ =P+λNI,
λN being a scalar that declines (at a suitable rate) as the sample size N goes to inﬁnity
and I being the identity matrix. Darolles, Florens and Renault (2002) and Newey and
Powell (2003) offer solutions to the estimation problem in more general terms than we
described here.
The key implication of this discussion is that a wage equation that is linear or
nonlinear in years of education can in principle be estimated by instrumental variables,
without saying much about the structure of the education choice model, other than the
standard conditions on the instruments. The most important restriction that has been
imposed in this discussion is that the returns to education are homogeneous, or more
precisely that education choice does not depend on heterogeneous returns to education.
2.4.2 Heterogeneous returns to years of education and nonparametric models
If individuals have say different learning abilities the wage returns to education may
differ across individuals. A simple way of expressing this is to rewrite the Mincer
model as
lnwi = ai+bisi+cAge. (28)
where ai and bi are unobservables. Now rewrite the above in the form
lnwi = a+bsi+cAge+[ai−a+(bi−b)si]
where the term in square brackets [ai−a+(bi−b)si] is the residual . If the individual
takes account of ai and bi in choosing si, or indeed if any mechanism allocating school-
ing to individuals depends on ai and bi then OLS will be inconsistent for b = E(bi). So
38the question is how can we estimate b or other interesting features of the distribution
of the wage returns. These may include the impact of education level s for those who
choose that level (analogous to the effect of treatment on the treated). When si is bin-
ary, this is the subject of the extensive treatment effects literature, which has also been
extended to continuous treatments.22 We discuss the binary or multiple discrete case
in the following section, when we go back to our theoretical framework of education
choice and wages.
To start off we deﬁne the reduced form model for education choice. Thus we spe-
cify
S = P(Z)+V (29)
where we deﬁne P(Z) ≡ E(S|Z).
The ﬁrst important lesson from this literature is that Instrumental Variables as
deﬁned in 23 is not consistent for the average parameter b = E(bi), i.e. for the average
returns to education, without further restrictions. Heckman and Vytlacil (1998) show
that IV is consistent for E(bi) with the additional assumption that E((bi−b)vi|Z)=0,
implied by the stronger assumption (A,B,V) ⊥⊥ Z, where the capital letters are the
random variables and ai, bi and vi are their speciﬁc realisation respectively.
To see that this is a strong assumption suppose that the instrument Z was random-
ised. In the standard IV framework, this would be sufﬁcient for identiﬁcation, because
randomisation guarantees that E(ai|Z)=0. Now however, we need to take a stance
about the actual model generating educational choices. Suppose for instance that the
true model generating educational choices took the form S = D(Z,u) where u is un-
observed heterogeneity. While (ai,bi,ui) ⊥⊥ Z is guaranteed by randomisation we
require the stronger assumption that (ai,bi,vi) ⊥⊥ Z for v = S−E[D(Z,u)|Z] or at that
E[bivi|Z]=0; this does not follow without further assumptions. The implication of this
22see Heckman and Robb (1985), Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999), Imbens and Angrist (1994),
Florens, Heckman, Meghir and Vytlacil (2008) , Imbens and Newey (2009) and Altonji and Matzkin (2005)
amongst many others.
39discussion is clear: even if the assumptions underlying IV are valid, the interpretation
of IV coefﬁcients is unclear and will depend on the structure of the education model
itself. We now go deeper into this issue.
More generally, suppose the education model is nonlinear in education si so that
we can write (ignoring other variables)
lnw = g(S,e) (30)
where e is a vector of unobserved characteristics and where S will in general depend on
e. A number of papers have attempted to tackle this important problem in various ways,
by making different assumptions and considering identiﬁcation of different aspects of
the model. These include Chesher (2003), Altonji and Matzkin (2005), Imbens and
Newey (2009) and Florens, Heckman, Meghir and Vytlacil (2008).23 Without getting
into too much detail we brieﬂy review some of these here.
Altonji and Matzkin develop two approaches. In the one that is most relevant to our
problem they make a conditional independence assumption that the distribution of the
error term f(·) is such that f(e|Z,S)=f(e|Z), i.e. conditional on Z the distribution of
the error term does not depend on schooling. In this case e can be a two dimensional
vector of errors that affects log wages in some arbitrary way. The authors identify the
average effect of schooling on wages at each level of schooling s, i.e. E(
∂g(S,e)
∂S |S = s),
based on their assumption.
Chesher (2003) develops identiﬁcation results for the impact of the endogenous
variable (here schooling) on quantiles of the distribution of the outcome. His identiﬁca-
tion results rely on weaker than usual local independence conditions; these require that
speciﬁc quantiles of the distributions of the unobservables are insensitive to changes in
the instrument. He also requires that the outcome of interest, here the wage, is mono-
tonically related to the unobservables. In this his model is more restrictive than that of
23Blundell and Powell (2004) show identiﬁcation and estimation for nonseparable models with a binary
dependent variable.
40Florens et al. (2008) and Imbens and Newey. If all quantiles of the unobservables are
insensitive to the instrument, then global identiﬁcation follows.
One issue that is important is that the local independence conditions do not have
a clear relationship with an underlying choice model. While we can specify sufﬁcient
conditions on behaviour for full independence to be satisﬁed no such conditions have
been speciﬁed for local independence, when full independence is not valid.
Imbens and Newey (2009) consider a general case where e in equation 30 is a
vector of unobservables, and hence they allow for a completely ﬂexible speciﬁcation
of heterogeneity in 30. To prove identiﬁcation they specify the equation assigning
values to the endogenous variable, which in our case is the model of education choice
to take the form
S = P(Z,U) (31)
where the function P is strictly monotonic in U. They deﬁne the control variate V =
FS|Z(S,Z); in a binary choice context this would be the probability of S = 1 give Z.
The core of the identiﬁcation result in their paper is based on the following three
assumptions:
1. The function P in 31 is strictly monotonic inU;
2. The errors (U,e) are independent of Z,i.e. (U,e)⊥⊥ Z. This implies that S and e
are independent conditional onV;
3. The support ofV given S is the same as the support of S.
To understand the meaning of this last assumption return to the deﬁnition of V and
suppose Z does not affect V for some S = s￿; in this case the support of V given S = s￿
would be degenerate. Thus this assumption requires Z to affect V, which makes it
equivalent to a rank condition. However, it also has another important implication
41because it requires Z to be able to span the entire support of V whatever schooling
level we consider. To see why this may be restrictive, suppose U is unobserved ability
and Z are the observable costs. The assumption effectively requires that Z varies in
such a way as to ensure that all ability levels (U) are represented within each schooling
level S.
Under these assumptions the authors prove identiﬁcation of the "quantile structural
function", i.e. they can identify the quantiles of g(S,e), deﬁned as q(τ,S) where τ
stands for the quantile of g(S,e).This allows them to identify quantile effects, i.e. how
changesineducationchangetheτthquantileofwages(q(τ,S=s)−q(τ,S=s￿)). They
also derive a number of other identiﬁcation results under weaker assumptions, which
are beyond the scope of this chapter.
Florens, Heckman, Meghir and Vytlacil (2008) consider a more restrictive class
of models, but obtain identiﬁcation under a weaker rank condition, namely that of
measurable separability, discussed below. The class of models they consider take the
following nonseparable form





where the function g(·) is not known. The model discussed in Newey and Powell
(2003) and Newey, Powell and Vella (1999) is one where K = 0. More generally, this
functionisnon-separableineducationS andunobservedheterogeneity. Therestrictions
vis-a-vis Imbens and Newey (2009) is that g(S) has to be differentiable up to the order
K and the maximum value of heterogeneous terms K needs to be known in advance.
In the context of Florens et al. (2008) , no identiﬁcation results have been proved for
the case where K is unknown and has to be estimated. The object of interest for the
Florens et al. (2008) core identiﬁcation result is the "Average Treatment Effect", or the













standard instrumental variables will not work. Florens et al. (2008) make the following
assumptions (omitting some technical details).
1. The function g is differentiable to the Kth order.
2. Control Function: E(εj|Z,S)=rj(V) for j = 0,...,K, where rj(·) is a known or
identiﬁable function andV is deﬁned in 29.
3. Rank condition (measurable separability): S and V are measurably separated,
that is, any function of S almost surely equal to a function of V must be almost
surely equal to a constant.
Theorem [from Florens et al. (2008) , Theorem 1 p 1197] Given assumptions 1, 2 and
3 above the average wage returns to education in 33 as well as the wage returns to
education for those who chose schooling level S = s are identiﬁed.
This identiﬁcation theorem deﬁnes conditions under which we can actually identify
the wage returns to education even with errors that enter in a non-separable way and in
a very general fashion. It is important of course to understand the limitations implied
by the assumptions.
Assumption 1 precludes any kinks or discontinuities in the relationship between
education and wages; discontinuities could be induced by sheepskin effects, where
wages may jump discontinuously upon graduation for instance.
Assumption 2 is similar (but not identical) to the usual exclusion restriction. It
states that all the dependence between the unobservables in the education equation and
the educational assignment rule can be expressed through some known or identiﬁable
43function of the residual in the educational equation reduced form. This assumption is
the same as the one used in Heckman (1979) and many others since;24 In Heckman
(1979) the control function is the Mills ratio. Imbens and Newey (2009) use the same
concept of a control variate. This control variate induces conditional independence
between schooling and unobserved heterogeneity. The third assumption is a rank con-
dition: it requires sufﬁcient independent variation of V and S; If the instrument Z did
not "explain" S this condition would not be satisﬁed. Note however, that measurable
separability does not require the support of V given S to be the same as the support of
V. As such it is a weaker assumption than the one used by Imbens and Newey (2009).
These assumptions seem overly technical; we need to explain what they mean in
terms of economic behaviour. Unfortunately necessary and sufﬁcient conditions are
not available. Florens et al. (2008) provide sufﬁcient conditions on a structural model
of education choice for the conditions to be satisﬁed. In particular they posit a model
where the education choice can be written as 31 whereU is a continuous scalar random
variable and P is an increasing function ofU. This is restrictive, because it requires that
just one unobservable factor characterises educational choice and that this variable is
monotonically related to education. For example, if the level of education depends on
unobservable costs and on labour market ability then S will depend on two unobserved
factors that may not be possible to aggregate them into one satisfying the monotonicity
assumption. Florens et al. (2008) show that if the instrument Z is independent of all
unobservables in the model i.e. Z⊥⊥ (U,ε0,ε1,...,εK), then under the assumption of
measurable separability between U and S assumptions 2 and 3 of the theorem are sat-
isﬁed and identiﬁcation of the average wage return to education follows. Hence results
obtained under the control function assumption can be interpreted in the context of any
education choice model that can be expressed as S = S(Z,U), which is monotonic in
U.
24See Heckman and Robb (1985) and Newey, Powell and Vella (1999)
442.4.3 Education choice and Wages: A Simple Illustration and Discussion
Florens, Heckman, Meghir and Vytlacil (2008) present the following example to
illustrate the issues. Suppose that the discounted annualised earnings ﬂows for s years










where εk and vk (k = 0,1) are, respectively, unobserved heterogeneity in the wage level
and in the cost of schooling. We impose the normalisations that E(εk)=0, E(vk)=0,
for k = 0,1. We implicitly condition on variables such as human capital characteristics
that affect both wages and the costs of schooling. The Z are factors that only affect the
cost of schooling, such as tuition costs.
Assume that agents choose their level of education to maximise wages minus costs.
Let S denote the resulting optimal choice of education. S solves the ﬁrst order condition
(ϕ1−C1(Z))+(ϕ2−C2(Z))S+ε1−v1 = 0.
Assuming that ϕ2 −C2(Z) < 0 for all Z, the second order condition for a maximum






This choice equation satisﬁes the monotonicity restriction discussed above and if Z
is randomised it will be jointly independent of εk and vk (k = 0,1). This implies the
controlfunctionassumptionandthemodelisidentiﬁedwithoutknowledgeoforfurther
restrictions on the functional form of the wage and the education choice equations.
45However this result is sensitive to changes in both the degree of heterogeneity in
wages or directly in the cost function because both can affect the structure of educa-
tional choice. Consider the same example as before, except now the second derivative





In itself this poses no problem, except that in an optimising model it will change the




In this case, the structural model makes S a function of V =( ε1 −v1,ε2), which can
satisfy the independence assumption if Z is randomised, i.e. Z ⊥⊥ (V,ε0,ε1,ε2) but V
is not a scalar error. We can still construct an education model depending monoton-
ically on one error term but this new error term will not generally be independent of
Z: deﬁne a residual ˜ V = FS|Z(S|Z); the "reduced form" education choice equation can
then be written as S = ˜ g(Z, ˜ V)=F−1
S|Z(˜ V|Z), which is increasing in ˜ V. Thus S is strictly
increasing in a scalar error term ˜ V that is independent of Z by construction. However,
Z is not independent of (˜ V,ε0,ε1,ε2) as required by the identiﬁcation theorem, despite
the fact that it is independent of the original errors (V,ε0,ε1,ε2). To see why, note that










￿= Pr(˜ V ≤ v|ε0,ε1,ε2)
In the above varying Z changes the set of v1 for which the condition is true and hence
the distribution of ˜ V depends on Z.
This example illustrates how the speciﬁcation of the educational choice model has
46implications for the identiﬁability of the wage returns to education. As emphasised by
Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) and Abbring and Heckman (2007) informational
assumptions can play an important role: here if the individual knows and takes into ac-
count the complete structure of wages the educational choice model becomes such that
the sufﬁcient assumptions for identiﬁcation used by most papers in this literature may
no longer be valid depending on the degree of heterogeneity in the wage equation.
Hence even in a non-parametric framework and with randomised instruments the in-
terpretation of results will depend crucially on the model driving educational choice:
randomisation of the instruments is not sufﬁcient in this respect. Thus, what transpires
from the above is that identiﬁcation depends on the nature of education choice, beyond
the simple statement that a valid instrument is available.25 This contrasts to an extent
with what is known about models with homogeneous effects.
In the next section we will consider explicitly educational choice as discrete. This
framework permits consideration of identiﬁcation and estimation issues based on richer
models of educational choice.
2.5 Identiﬁcation and Estimation of the wage returns to Education
in the dynamic discrete education choice model.
We now return to the dynamic multisector model of education choice described in
section 2.2. This is a more complex model because it recognises the sequential nature
of education choice and allows for uncertainty, which gets revealed gradually between
different educational stages. It also allows for the possibility of comparative advantage
for a particular educational level.26 Our aim is to review approaches to identifying and
estimating measures of the returns to education, such as the average treatment effect or
the Local Average treatment effect.
25valid in the traditional sense of being uncorrelated to unobservables and correlated with education.
26See for example Heckman and Sedlacek (1985).
47There is a vast literature on discrete treatment effects and their identiﬁcation. Some
of the most important results are presented in Heckman and Robb (1985), Heckman,
LaLonde and Smith (1999), Imbens and Angrist (1994), Heckman and Vytlacil (2005),
Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2010) and many others. Most papers deﬁne statist-
ical assumptions that lead to identiﬁcation. Some make the additional important step
of relating these assumptions to the underlying economic behaviour a prime example
being Vytlacil (2002).
We focus on two issues that arise when using the model of section 2.2 as an organ-
ising framework. There are two issues. First to what extent is the full model nonpara-
metrically identiﬁed and second if the full model is not identiﬁed under what conditions
can we at least identify the marginal distribution of earnings for each education level,
so as to get to the average returns to education.
Magnac and Thesmar (2002) explicitly analyse the identiﬁcation in dynamic dis-
crete choice models with uncertainty where the data only include the discrete choices
as well as observations on the relevant state variables. In our case these would be the
education choices and the variables determining the costs of education respectively (Z).
No observations on outcomes motivating such choices, such as income are observed.
They show that even in the absence of persistent unobserved heterogeneity the model is
seriously underidentiﬁed: to identify the within period utility, without functional form
restrictions one needs to know the distribution of the shocks, the discount factor and
the current and future preferences for a reference alternative. Exclusion restrictions
between alternatives can improve things but not by much.
However, when we observe outcome variables such as earnings and when we can
link the choice of a level of education to the observed outcome as indeed the model
presented in section 2.2 the prospects for identiﬁcation improve. Heckman and Navarro
(2007) present a number of identiﬁcation theorems relating to the dynamic structural
model itself and to the distribution of earnings in each education level. Many of the
48issues can be understood by taking the simpler framework of Heckman, Urzua and
Vytlacil (2006a,b) (HUV henceforth).
Consider ﬁrst a simple framework where education choice can be expressed as a
once and for all choice at a point in time. Individuals choose the level of education
among a set of possible levels. However the levels are not necessarily ordered. The
underlying reason why the choices are not ordered are the dynamics: it is possible that
an individual choosing between dropping out of school or attending high school, could
choose the former, in the absence of any other choice, but that if the choice of college
is added, then they could progress to college (via high school graduation). HUV study
identiﬁcation of models with discrete treatments and unordered choices and provide
identiﬁcation results, which we outline brieﬂy here.
Write the net payoff to education as
RJ(ZJ,X)=ϑJ(ZJ,X)−VJ, J = S,H,C (35)
where ZJ is the set of variables that affect education choice J; these could be the costs
that affect a particular education level, such as fees or transport costs to the closest
educational institution. Because of dynamics all ZJ may be the same (see below). Let
Z = {ZS,ZH,ZC}. The payoff to education is earnings and is given by 5. Now make
the following assumptions as in HUV
1. The unobservables are jointly independent of Z, X and age: (τS +εJ
t ,VJ, J =
S,H,C)⊥⊥ { Z, age, Xi}
2. The support (supp) of the functions ϑJ(ZJ) and mJ(age,X) is independent of
49each other so that
supp{ϑJ(ZJ,X),mJ(age,X),J = S,H,C} =
ϑS(ZS,X)×mS(age,X)×ϑH(ZH,X)×mH(age,X)×ϑC(ZC,X)×mC(age,X)
3. The structures of the functions ϑJ(ZJ) and of the variables ZJ is such that their
support is at least as large as the support ofVJ :
supp{ϑJ(ZJ)} ⊇ supp{VJ}
4. Given age and Z, X has full rank
These assumptions imply that we can ﬁnd combinations of values of Z such that the
probability of any choice J becomes 1. Within that "limit set" as Heckman and Navarro
(2007) call them we can identify the marginal distribution of earningsYJ conditional on
age and X. The latter follows from the independence assumption that ensures that the
distribution of earnings is the same for whatever value of Z and by the rank condition
that ensures that whatever the value of Z and age there is sufﬁcient variation in X. In
addition if all we are interested is average earnings given X and age, then all we need
is that the errors in the earnings equation are mean independent of Z, age and X.
This identiﬁcation result suggests an estimation strategy for mean earnings. Sup-
pose the only X regressor was age. Then we can estimate mean earnings for education









where K( ˆ p(Zi)−1) is a kernel giving maximum weight when ˆ p(Zi)=1. This is a
50weighted average of the earnings of (potentially) all individuals with education level
J, with the weights being higher the higher the predicted probability of attaining that
level. The weights towards individuals with probability equal to one of achieving this
level increase as the sample size increases, but at a rate which is slower than the sample
size increase. Clearly this estimation procedure is only justiﬁed if the limit sets exist
in the population and the assumptions detailed above are justiﬁed. Below we discuss
further the support assumptions and the consequences of them being violated. But
before this we turn to the model that is explicitly dynamic.
The question is how different is the dynamic context in terms of the required as-
sumptions for identifying the marginal distributions of earnings corresponding to dif-
ferent education levels. By examining equations 12, 13 and 14 it is apparent that all
probabilities depend on all Zs so long as these are all known when the decisions are
made sequentially over time. Second it is also apparent that the probabilities are non-
linear functions of unobserved heterogeneity and the decision problem is not separable
in observables and unobservables as in 35. The education choice model has the non-
separable form
RJ = ϑJ(Z,X,e) J = S,H,C (36)
where RJ is the lifecycle value of alternative J and where e is a vector of unobservables.
Of course there is some structure to this, which will matter both in terms of understand-
ing whether the assumptions are valid or not and for identifying the dynamic discrete
choice model. Heckman and Navarro (2007) make assumptions on the primitives of
the model so that the support conditions discussed above carry over to this context. As
before we need to be able to argue that the required limit sets exist. Given they exist
the same identiﬁcation argument applies as before.
512.6 Using Bounds to estimate the returns to education
The idea of limit sets is interesting intellectually but in practice it is highly un-
likely that we observe suitable variables such that the limit sets exist. The variables
we observe are likely to have limited support; for example it is unlikely that we will
observe such a range of fees that at one end all attend college (presumably this would
require a hefty subsidy) and at the other no one did. Even combining this with other
cost type variables like distance from college we are not likely to ﬁnd a set where the
probabilities of attendance reach the limit or even come close; the condition that the
distribution of earnings conditional on other observables is the same within such limit
sets, is even less likely to be satisﬁed. However, such identiﬁcation strategies help us
understand the nature of the problem and can sometimes points to other strategies. One
strategy is to use the model we described in 2.2 or other such suitable speciﬁcation, im-
posing distributional and other functional form assumptions. Indeed, even if the model
is conceptually identiﬁed this may be a way of improving efﬁciency in practice. A dia-
metrically opposite alternative is to make minimal assumptions and follow the route of
partial identiﬁcation and use bounds as discussed in Manski (1994), Manski and Pep-
per (2000) and Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura and Meghir (2007). In the context of this
discussion the latter approach is particularly useful: it offers an alternative approach to
learning something about the distribution of earnings with minimal assumptions and
illustrates clearly the identiﬁcation problem and how the limit set assumption resolves
it.
Suppose we wish to identify the marginal distribution of earnings given a level
of education J for individuals with characteristics X, F(YJ|X). Based on the law of
iterated expectations we can write
F(YJ=j < y|X)=F(YJ < y|X,J = j)Pr(J = j|X)+F(YJ < y|X,J ￿= j)Pr(J ￿= j|X)
52where where F(YJ <y|X,J ￿= j) is the distribution of earnings corresponding to level J
for those that did not choose level J. This is not observed and without further assump-
tions all we can say is that lies in the closed interval [0,1]. Then this implies the "worst
case" bounds
F(YJ < y|X,J = j)Pr(J = j|X)
≤ F(YJ=j < y|X) ≤
F(YJ < y|X,J = j)Pr(J = j|X)+Pr(J ￿= j|X)
Because of the lack of any exclusion restrictions the lower and upper bounds can never
be equal; in other words without further assumptions the distribution of earnings in
each education group are never identiﬁed and of course neither is any notion of a wage
return to education.
Now suppose we do possess a set of instruments Z as above from which education
in level J is independent of. The assumption is that F(YJ=j < y|Z,X)=F(YJ=j <
y|X). Thus Z is excluded from earnings. However, these affect both the probability
of selecting education choice J and through selection they also affect the conditional
distributions. Thus for each value of the instruments Z and each education level J we
have that
F(YJ < y|Z,X,J = j)Pr(J = j|Z,X)
≤ F(YJ=j < y|X) ≤
F(YJ < y|Z,X,J = j)Pr(J = j|Z,X)+Pr(J ￿= j|Z,X)
Since the distribution of earnings does not depend on Z we can choose the best bounds
53across Zs. Thus the tightest bounds are
maxZ
￿
F(YJ < y|Z,X,J = j)Pr(J = j|Z,X)
￿
≤ F(YJ=j < y|X) ≤
minZ
￿
F(YJ < y|Z,X,J = j)Pr(J = j|Z,X)+Pr(J ￿= j|Z,X)
￿
(37)
This links the approach with the earlier discussion: given the exclusion restrictions and
assuming the distribution of X is not degenerate given Z, a necessary and sufﬁcient
condition for the distribution of earnings to be identiﬁed is that the upper and lower
bounds in 37 to be equal. The existence of limit sets as discussed in Heckman and
Navarro (2007) would imply such an equality. However this is just a sufﬁcient condi-
tion, and it is possible that the bounds are equal without the limit set assumption. The
difﬁculty is understanding how such conditions may relate to an underlying model of
choice and can we expect them to hold.
If identiﬁcation is not obtainable, i.e. if
maxZ
￿





F(YJ < y|Z,X,J = j)Pr(J = j|Z,X)+Pr(J ￿= j|Z,X)
￿
(38)
for some are all X, then we can only obtain bounds on the distribution of earnings
and thus bounds on its quantiles. Moreover, without bounds on the support of YJ we
cannot obtain bounds on means and variances and other moments, other than the order
statistics. In this case we need to either impose restrictions on the support or compare
the order statistics as a measure of the wage returns to education. To see how this works
suppose we wish to compare quantile q. Deﬁne wql(J = j,Z,X) the w that solves the
54equation
q = F(w|Z,X,J = j)Pr(J = j|Z,X) (39)
and wqu(Z,X,J = j) the solution to
q = F(w|Z,X,J = j)Pr(J = j|Z,X)+(1−Pr(J = j|Z,X)) (40)
Thus the upper bound of the qth quantile for a particular value of Z is equal to the
q/Pr(J = j|Z,X) quantile of the observed distribution of earnings for those with educa-
tion level j. The lower bound is the (q−(1−Pr(J = j|Z,X)))/Pr(J = j|Z,X) quantile
of the same observed distribution. To then use the exclusion restriction the best bounds






≤ wq(X,J = j) ≤ min
Z
{wqu(Z,X,J = j)}
Now suppose we deﬁne the wage returns to education as the difference in the medians
of the two distributions. This measure of gain is bounded by
wql(X,J =C)−wqu(X,J = H) ≤ ∆C/H ≤ wqu(X,J =C)−wql(X,J = H) (41)
where q = 0.5. This is not equivalent to the wage returns usually presented, which cor-
responds to comparing means. Thus, lack of point identiﬁcation has led us to compare
different aspects of the distribution of earnings across education groups.
To implement the bounds approach we can directly estimate the conditional distri-
bution of earnings given each education group. BGIM (in the context of selection into
work rather than education - see below) use
















normal distribution function and it is used instead of the indicator function 1(wi ≤ w)
to provide some smoothness. As the sample size gets bigger we can reduce h, then this
function becomes zero very fast as observations above w are used and is one for values
of wi even slightly lower than w. For the sample size in the BGIM study h was set at a
























Once the distributions of wages and the probability of attainment conditional on Z have
been estimated we can then apply 38 to bound the distribution, which can then be used
to estimate the bounds to the quantiles. Here an interesting observation can be made:
the bounds that depend on the exclusion restrictions Z may cross. This can happen
either because the restrictions are wrong or because the ample is small. We can thus
devise a test of the null hypothesis that the bounds are equal against the alternative
that the lower bound is above the upper bound. Rejecting implies the restrictions are
invalid. The test has power against the alternative, but cannot detect invalid restrictions
that do not lead to the bounds crossing. BGIM discuss such tests and implement it
using the bootstrap. Kitagawa (2010) derives formally a test for independence in a
similar context.
2.7 A special case: binary educational choice
Many problems in the broad area of education and training can be represented as
the impact of a binary treatment, whose choice may be endogenous. A prime example
56is the impact of vocational training. In this case the wage equation would take the form
lnwi = a+biTi+ui (42)







i represents wages in the no training state and w1
i represents wages in the
training state. Estimation and identiﬁcation of this model has been widely analysed
with some of the key results to be found in Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999).
We do not reproduce these here; however we complete our discussion of instrumental
variables by pointing out the interpretation of this estimator in this context.
Suppose we possess a binary instrument Z; for example an indicator as to whether
some individuals are facing a different policy environment, such as a training subsidy
and which we take as having been randomly allocated. Suppose the model is the simple
Roy model with just a binary education/training choice (Ti = {1,0}).
Instrumental variables for this problem has been analysed by Imbens and Angrist
(1994). Deﬁne T(1) and T(0) to be indicators of whether an individual would take
up training when Z = 1 and Z = 0 respectively. They assume that the instrument Z
is jointly independent from all unobservables i.e. (lnw0,lnw1,T(1),T(0) ⊥⊥ Z); they
also make a critical monotonicity assumption: no person who would have obtained
training when facing environment Z = 0 refrains from training when Z = 1. In terms
of the notation above we have that for all individuals T(1) ≥ T(0).27 Under these
assumption they show that using Z as an instrument in the above regression (42) will
27Obviously all that matters is that Zi induces either no movement or movement in the same direction for
all individuals. So we need to have either that T(1) ≥ T(0) for all individuals or alternatively thatT(0) ≥
T(1) for all individuals.
57identify the effect of T on wages for those choosing T = 1 when facing Z = 1 (e.g.
whenofferedthesubsidy)andwhowouldhavechosenT =0ifinsteadtheyfacedZ =0
(no subsidy).28 The effect is known as the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE).
LATE is not invariant to the choice of instrument: different policies that act on different
margins, i.e. induce different types of individuals into training, can lead to different
estimates of the effect if it is heterogeneous. However, in each case the effect can be
interpreted as causal. What is under question is the external validity/generalisability of
the estimate. We are left with a situation where we can estimate the impact of training
in some speciﬁc context, but we cannot necessarily generalise to other contexts.
Vytlacil (2002) shows that the LATE assumptions are equivalent to those of the
traditional selection model. Thus the LATE assumptions are satisﬁed if and only if the
training choice can be represented by a threshold crossing model, i.e.
T = 1 ⇐⇒ ς > g(Z) (44)
where the unobservables in 44 and 42 satisfy the independence assumption (ς,b,u)⊥⊥
Z. This means that if we can transform the decision rule implied by an economic model
into the form 44 with all unobservables jointly independent of Z then that economic
model is consistent with the assumptions implied by LATE.
Important cases where these conditions may not be satisﬁed is when there are gen-
eral equilibrium effects or peer/congestion effects. Suppose that Z represents a subsidy
to college education and suppose that many individuals take up college education. This
may well discourage individuals with say high lnw0
i from attending college, when they
may have done so without the subsidy.
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) provide an elegant way of interpreting LATE and
placing it in a broader family of treatment effects.29 Suppose we represent binary
28i.e. the effect for those for whom T(1)=1 and T(0)=0
29see also Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2010)
58education choice by a threshold crossing model, which satisﬁes the monotonicity re-
striction (Vytlacil, 2002)
Pr(Ti = 1|Z)=Pr(κ(Z) < v)
An individual is deﬁned as marginal with respect to this training choice if κ(Z)=v:
given Z the unobservable characteristics are such that the beneﬁts and costs of training
exactly outweigh each other. A small increase of the beneﬁts will draw this person in.
The marginal treatment effect at some value of Z is the effect of training on individuals
who are just indifferent between accepting training and not, i.e. bMTE(z)=E(bi|κ(Z =
z)=v. For convenience we can rewrite this relationship by deﬁning κu(Z)=F(κ(Z))
so that we can deﬁne the marginal individual as κu(Z = z)=p where p ∈ [0,1]. Now
consider a policy that increases Z from a to b. Then the LATE parameter is the aver-
age effect for all those individuals in the range [κu(Z = a),κu(Z = b)]. If on the other
hand the policy increases the value of Z by some ﬁxed value, and assuming the LATE
assumptions are valid at all Z, then LATE will be an average across different LATE val-
ues corresponding to the different starting points for Z. More generally, with Z being
continuous one can imagine estimating an MTE parameter at all levels of Z. Heck-
man and Vytlacil (2005) show that the average MTE is the average treatment effect.
Moreover, all treatment effect parameters, such as the average effect of treatment on
the treated, can be expressed as weighted averages of the MTE over different relevant
ranges. From a policy perspective the MTE offers us a way of estimating the marginal
beneﬁt in terms of our outcome variable (such as wages) of a small increase in say the
incentive to obtain training.






59Thus we can estimate a nonparametric regression of Y on P(Z), where P(Z) is the
propensity score or the probability that treatment is assigned, given Z. The estimate of
the marginal treatment effect then is the derivative of this nonparametric estimator.
As a tool the MTE can be very useful. For example suppose we estimate the MTE
for going to college as a function of different levels of p; and suppose that we ﬁnd that
the MTE is high for those with a low probability of attending college. This indicates
that a policy that targets those with a low probability of attendance is likely to have
high returns. In some circumstances, such an empirical ﬁnding may be interpreted
as reﬂecting the presence of liquidity or other constraints of attending college. The
difﬁculty with the MTE is the extent that the instruments Z can span a continuous
supportoftheprobabilityofbeingassignedtotreatmentbetween0and1. Itisgenerally
difﬁcult to identify instruments that satisfy the independence assumptions and have
sufﬁcient support. In practice many discrete instruments may serve that purpose.
3 The returns to education and labour force participa-
tion
3.1 Bias to the estimated returns when Participation is ignored
We have emphasised the issue of endogenous education when estimating the re-
turns. However, another equally important problem when estimating the returns is that
of missing wages for nonworking individuals. Comparing the wages of workers can
lead to biased results on the returns to education because those with missing wages are
60not selected randomly: suppose we measure the wage returns to college by
∆C/H = E(lnw|C,P = 1)−E(lnw|H,P = 1)
If education affects participation in the labour market (P = 1) then the ability compos-
ition of those working with a college degree will be different from the ability compos-
ition for those working with a high school degree even if education is exogenous for
wages. This problem is important because the proportion of nonworkers can be very
high. In the UK for example in 2000 only 78% of men with statutory schooling and
85% high school graduates worked. For women the respective ﬁgures are 60% and
75%.
A simple analysis based on Heckman’s (1979) model will illustrate that ignoring
non-participation is likely to lead to an underestimate of the returns to education. The
intuition is simple: if education increases participation the composition of the workers
with higher level of education will be worse than the composition of the workers with
lower levels of education, where participation is lower. This intuitive analysis is based
on many strong assumptions. For example is individuals sort into educational groups
by comparative advantage it is no longer obvious how the bias will go. One way of
understandingthepotentialamountofbiasistouseManski’s(1994)worstcasebounds.
Denote by F(w|ed) the distribution of wages for the entire population with educa-
tion level ed, irrespective of work status. Assume for simplicity that education itself
is exogenous. The concept here is that each individual has some wage they would
earn were they to work; however this wage is not observed when the individual is not
employed. Hence F(w|ed) is not itself observed. Instead we observe F(w|ed,P = 1),
where P = 1 denotes those working. The two are related by
F(w|ed)=F(w|ed,P = 1)Pr(P = 1|ed)+F(w|ed,P = 0)Pr(P = 0|ed)
61where F(w|ed,P = 0) is not observed. This implies that
F(w|ed,P = 1)Pr(P = 1|ed) ≤ F(w|ed) ≤ F(w|ed,P = 1)+Pr(P = 0|ed)
which implies that the width of the bounds for the unconditional distribution of wages
is Pr(P = 0|ed), giving a potentially very large range for the order statistics (me-
dian, quartiles etc.) of the wage distribution and leaving all the order statistics below
Pr(P = 0|ed) and above Pr(P = 1|ed) unidentiﬁed. Moreover without restrictions on
the support of wages it is not possible to bound the mean of wages corresponding to
F(w|ed), without other information or restrictions. This means that the wage returns
to education are unidentiﬁed and those based on comparing order statistics, such as the
medians can lie in very wide ranges. Although this is deﬁnitely not a novel point it is
often overlooked when estimating returns to education.
3.2 Accounting for non-participation
The original way of dealing with the issue was that of correcting wages for selec-
tion into employment as in Gronau (1974) and Heckman (1974, 1979) and many others
that followed. Heckman and Honoré (1990) provided an in-depth analysis of identiﬁc-
ation in a Roy model that includes the simple selection model. Heckman (1990), Ahn
and Powell (1993), and Das, Newey, and Vella (2003) developed further identiﬁcation
results. The literature on selectivity corrected wage equations is vast and we will not
discuss it further here.
Alternatively we discuss recent developments on using bounds to account for se-
lection when estimating the distribution of wages or more speciﬁcally the returns to
education. In an earlier section we illustrated the use of bounds for allowing for the
endogeneity of wages. Here we discuss the approach of Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura
and Meghir (2007) (henceforth BGIM) who develop bounds that allow us to control
62for the effects of selection into work.
Worst case bounds are generally too wide to be useful, other than to illustrate that
without any assumptions it is very difﬁcult to say anything. Thus BGIM obtain tighter
bounds by using three different restrictions. In the ﬁrst they assume that the distribution
ofwagesofworkerseitherstochasticallydominatestheunobservedoneofnon-workers
or at least has a higher median than that of non-workers. The idea here is that there
is positive selection into the labour market. Under the stronger stochastic dominance
restriction the lower bound to the distribution of wages increases and we obtain that
F(w|ed,P = 1) ≤ F(w|ed) ≤ F(w|ed,P = 1)Pr(P = 1|ed)+Pr(P = 0|ed).
This restriction is never testable. In addition it does not follow from economic theory,
particularly if we do not condition on wealth. Indeed it is possible that higher wage
individuals have higher reservation wages because they are on average wealthier - this
would lead to a violation of the stochastic dominance assumption. On the other hand
there is circumstantial evidence, presented in BGIM that there is positive selection into
the labour market, even when we do not condition on wealth.
An alternative and non-nested set of restrictions relates to the use of instruments.
The idea is the same as the one presented earlier for the case of endogenous education.
Denote the instrument by Z. Note that while the observed distribution of wages for
workers F(w|Z,ed,P = 1) will depend on Z in general, the population distribution of
63wages F(w|ed) will not, by assumption. Then BGIM show the bounds to be30
maxz{F(w|Z = z,ed,P = 1)Pr(P = 1|Z = z,ed)}
≤ F(w|ed) ≤
minz{F(w|Z = z,ed,P = 1)Pr(P = 1|Z = z,ed)+Pr(P = 0|Z = z,ed)}.
. (46)
In the above expression we search over different values of z to identify the tightest
bounds. These may not necessarily be where Pr(P = 1|Z = z,ed) is maximised, unless
it goes to one. In contrast to the case with stochastic dominance this restriction has
some testable implications because its violation can lead to the bounds crossing, i.e. to
the lower bound being higher than the upper bound; this provides a means of testing
for the validity of the exclusion restriction, although note that it may be possible for
the restriction to be false and still the bounds may not cross. Hence the test may not
have power one against the null that wages are independent of the instrument (see the
section on bounds for endogenous education).
Manski and Pepper (2000) originally presented the idea of monotone instrumental
variables. In this case it is no longer assumed that wages are independent of the instru-
ment but that the mean of wages is monotonic in the instrument. BGIM extend this
idea to the entire distribution by assuming that
F(w|Z = z￿,ed) ≤ F(w|Z = z,ed) ∀ w, z, z￿ with z < z￿
30See Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura and Meghir (2007), equation 8.
64This then implies the following bounds conditional on some value of the instrument z1
F(w|Z = z1,ed) ≥ Fl(w|Z = z1,ed) ≡
max˙ z>z1 {F(w|ed,Z = z,P = 1)Pr(P = 1|Z = z,ed)}
F(w|Z = z1,ed) ≤ Fu(w|Z = z1,ed) ≡
max˙ z>z1 {F(w|ed,Z = z,P = 1)Pr(P = 1|Z = z,ed)+Pr(P = 0|Z = z,ed)}
By averaging over all possible values of z we can then obtain bounds to F(w|ed) that





≤ F(w|ed) ≤ Ez[Fu(w|z,ed)]
where Ez denotes the expectation with respect to the distribution of z. As in the case of
the exclusion restrictions, these bounds can cross if the monotonicity restriction is not
valid. Moreover, it is possible to combine the monotonicity assumption with positive
selection, such as stochastic dominance.
This procedure bounds the distribution of wages. This allows us to bound some
quantiles as discussed above, but not means without support conditions on the distri-
bution of wages. Bounding differences in the order statistics can give us a measure of
the wage returns to education; this is done as in equation 41. As an indication of the
results that one can obtain Table 1 presents results on bounds to the returns to college
versus high school estimated by BGIM for men in the UK. These use both the mono-
tonicity restriction and the assumption that the median wage of workers is higher of that
which non-workers would earn. The instrument used is the income that an individual
would have if they did not work; this is determined by the beneﬁt system in place at
the time and the demographic structure of the household. Interestingly BGIM report







Source BGIM, Figure 13;
Table 1: Bounds to the returns to college relative to high school by cohort - Males, UK
that the instrument they use is rejected when used as an exclusion restriction based on
the test for crossing bounds. This may reﬂect the fact that characteristics determining
out of work income maybe related to wages. The weaker monotonicity restriction al-
lows these factors to be correlated with wages, so long as the distribution of wages is
monotonically related to out of work income. Indeed, the monotonicity restriction is
not rejected. The reported returns correspond to different ages, because older cohorts
are not observed at younger ages. These bounds are quite tight and in some cases lead
effectively to point estimates. This illustrates the point that identiﬁcation may be ob-
tained without having to assume that participation rates are 1 for a set of values of the
instrument Z.
3.3 Non participation and endogeneity
Thediscussioninthischapterhasdealtwiththeimplicationsofendogeneityofedu-
cationwhenestimatingreturnsandseparatelywiththeimplicationsofnon-participation.
Both these issues are very important and ignoring them can cause bias. It is thus im-
portant to deal with both issues simultaneously, although this is not always done in the
empirical literature.
From a parametric view point the obvious way to proceed would be to extend the
model presented earlier for educational choice to one that also allowed for labour force
66participation. Two examples of such models are Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Adda,
Dustmann, Meghir and Robin (2009) among others. In these models individuals de-
cide on their educational attainment; subsequently during their labour market career
individuals also decide (among other choices) whether to work or not. Within this con-
text the models can be enriched further by allowing for endogenous accumulation of
human capital in work (experience) as in Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and the papers
mentioned above among others, and by allowing for search frictions as in Adda et al.
(2009) as well as earlier papers including for example Wolpin (1992). In these integ-
rated models the issue of endogeneity of education and labour force participation is
treated in a comprehensive, albeit fully parametric way. Non-parametric approaches,
either to point estimation or to just bounds have not been implemented in practice to
our knowledge and neither has a comprehensive analysis of identiﬁcation taken place.
However, preliminary unpublished calculations by Hide Ichimura and Costas Meghir
suggested that bounds would be too wide to be informative, even if we were to assume
that only those expecting to gain from education actually attended. Finding suitable
restrictions that would make such an approach informative would be an important ad-
vance.
To provide a brief illustration of how the model of section 2.2 can be generalised
to allow for non participation we rewrite the value functions for the period of working



























it Wages for education level J = S,H,C
Xit+1 = Xit +Pit Experience
(47)
In 47 Xit represents experience, which here is deﬁned as the number of periods working
in the labour market. We have introduced a ﬂow value for leisure, b(Xit)+ξit which is
stochastic and depends on experience, possibly reﬂecting the level of beneﬁts depend-
ent on past wages, or contributions to some unemployment insurance fund. Wages are





Experience Xit is endogenous, because it is an accumulation of past work decisions,
which depend on the unobserved heterogeneity component τJ
i . The terminal value
function could be speciﬁed as in 10, where X now represents experience at the time
when we stop having information on wages. To complete the model one needs to
specify the stochastic properties of the shocks ε and ξ including their distribution.
Because of the ﬁnite life nature of the model the value functions depend on age t as
well as on experience. Thus the model is solved backwards from the terminal point to
the point where the education decisions are made. The work value functions (VWJ,J =
S,H,C) are evaluated at zero experience when solving for the education choice. In
this model it is assumed that all education decisions are made at the beginning of the
31Recall that the education levels are S for statutory, H for high school andC for college.
68lifecycle, but there is no reason why we cannot further generalise the model to include
the possibility of returning to full time education after a period of work. Finally, note
that the return to education, as seen at the beginning of the lifecycle, will be generalised
now to include the effect of education on the length of work spells.
Estimation will be similar to that discussed in section 2.3 with the important modi-
ﬁcation that we need to model the probability of working in each period and we need
to account for the fact that wages are observed for workers only. Assuming for simpli-
city that εand ξ are iid normal the likelihood contribution for an observed career of Ti























The construction of the rest of the likelihood follows as in section likelihood follows
as in section 2.3.In particular 16completes the likelihood function including the step
relating to educational choice. The unobserved heterogeneity is integrated out and
the likelihood for the whole sample is put together as in 17 The joint distribution of
G(F,τ) accounts for the endogeneity of education in wages and participation over the
subsequent periods of the lifecycle.
Finally, we have already discussed the difﬁculties relating to nonparametric identi-
ﬁcation of such models, even without endogenous participation. Obviously with par-
ticipation being endogenous matters do not become easier because we would now need
to also identify the distribution of the shocks to leisure ξ as well as the distribution of
the shocks to wages. In practice many of these aspects will be speciﬁed parametrically.
However, identiﬁcation is aided by the presence of exogenous variation at the time of
69education choice. For example continuous (or even discrete) variables that affect the
costs of education and vary exogenously across individuals, can provide credible ex-
ogenoussourcesofidentiﬁcation. Attanasio, MeghirandSantiago(2009)arguethatthe
use of a randomized experiment with say educational incentives, as in the PROGRESA
conditional cash transfer programme in Mexico can serve such a purpose.
4 Education Policy and the estimated returns to Edu-
cation
We have argued that it is hard to interpret results from estimating wage equations
without a theoretical foundation. The need for models is reinforced when we consider
scaling up human capital policies. Consider for example the impact of a school subsidy
for children from low income families.32 Estimating the impact of such a policy on a
small scale is insufﬁcient for understanding its longer term effects, even if we can es-
timate the wage returns to education for those induced into education due to the policy.
Among other issues, we need to know the mechanism through which the subsidy acted:
was the increase primarily due to a distortion of incentives or due to the alleviation of
liquidityconstraints? Secondweneedtoknowwhatthegeneralequilibriumeffectsare.
The latter include i. the effect of changes in the supply of skill on skill prices, which
32 An example of such a policy is the Education Maintenance allowance in the UK, a subsidy to 16
year olds for post-compulsory school attendance. in the UK, evaluated by Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne and
Meghir (2009). This is a conditional cash transfer offered to pupils who completed statutory education at 16
and whose family’s income is low, on condition they remain in full time education At the time the policy was
evaluated in 1999-2001, the amount received was at a maximum when the family earned less than $20,800
a year and thereafter declined linearly up until the family income reached $48000, which was the eligibility
threshold. Based on a pilot/control comparison using matching the estimated effect of the policy was to
increase post-compulsory school participation by 6-7 percentage points for eligible children.
70can feed back on to the decision to obtain the extra education; ii. the potential dilution
of education quality as the resources are spread out more thinly; and iii. the peer effects
of keeping more of the 16 year olds in school, which could change the composition of
the classrooms as well as the cultural norms. Allowing for all this is a tall order and it
will be hard, to say the least, to build a credible model that will be able to capture all
these elements. One needs to make some realistic choices of which of these aspects are
likely to be of ﬁrst order importance. We will brieﬂy discuss dealing with the changes
in human capital prices as a result of the increased supply of educated workers due to
the subsidy. Important work in this ﬁeld of general equilibrium models with heterogen-
eous agents has been carried out by Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998), Lee (2005),
Lee and Wolpin (2006), and Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (2008).33
Startwiththemodelinsection2.2andassumethishasbeenestimatedondataeither
collected as part of the experimental pilot or from observational survey data. This is the
ﬁrst building block. Since the problem has been set up as a lifecycle one, to solve for
equilibrium one needs to set it up an an overlapping generations model. However, since
the environment is stationary the problem to be solved for each generation is identical.
Thus for any given set of human capital prices we can solve the individual problem
and then account for the number of individuals in each education group at each point
in time.
The next step is to estimate the production function of the form presented in sec-
tion 2.1. Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) for example estimate a production func-
tion with two human capital inputs: less than college and college, while Gallipoli et
al (2008) allow for three human capital inputs as in the model of sections 2.1 and
2.2. Both allow for one factor of capital. The estimated production function and the
assumption of competitive labour markets allows us to derive relative human capital
prices for each group as as function of employed human capital. Both authors estimate
33In Gallipoli et al (2008) we also consider other important issue, such as the role of parental transfers
liquidity constraints.
71substitution elasticities for the human capital inputs that imply quite a lot of sensitivity
of relative prices to changes in supplies.34
Simple policy simulation would then compare the baseline outcomes (essentially
the data) to the results from a simulated new steady state arising as a result of im-
plementing a new policy such as an educational subsidy. The simulation based on the
model described here would allow for the effect of changes in individual incentives; for
the impact of funding the subsidy by raising taxation through say income taxes, which
would compress the effects of education on wages; and for the effect of changes in
the return to education induced by a new equilibrium in the labour market as supplies
change.
The point is that all these effects can be potentially important and the results can
be sensitive to the assumed environment and the speciﬁcation of the model. Heckman,
Lochner and Taber (1998) show that the GE effects can almost neutralise the effects
of a policy. Lee (2005) has a different model speciﬁcation where the feedback effects
from GE are small. This shows that the results can be sensitive to important modelling
choices and that we do need to know all the components of the model to acquire a
good understanding of what the policy will achieve. Just estimating the wage returns
to education, even when we can do so based on a partial model, is useful but is only
part of the story as far as design of policy is concerned.
34 This may be controversial because in an open economy with more goods than factors, trade can lead
to factor price equalisation. If this was really the case then policies that changed the supply of human
capital would not affect human capital prices and would not be subject to such general equilibrium effects.
Nevertheless, factor price equalisation is either a very slow process or is prevented by other mechanisms.
725 Estimation of School Input Effects
Variationinthereturntoobservedschoolingcomesfrommanysources, oneofthemost
important of which is the quality of education. A growing body of research investig-
ates the effects of various educational inputs, and the proliferation of administrative
and survey data facilitates such analyses. Similar to research on school attainment, en-
dogenous choices and unobserved heterogeneity complicate efforts to identify variable
effects. Empirical models must explicitly or implicitly account for the inter-related
choices of families, teachers, administrators and policy makers to avoid contamination
from confounding factors. In this section we discuss selected papers covering four
topics that have generated substantial interest in education research in order to high-
light key empirical and methodological issues including the treatment of the multiple
decisions that determine the allocation of educational inputs. These areas are class
size effects, teacher quality, housing market capitalisation of school quality, and the
effects of choice and accountability. The selected papers use a variety of approaches
and types of data, and we emphasise implications of the speciﬁcation choices. Meth-
ods discussed include the use of observed characteristics as controls, various types of
IV techniques including regression discontinuity and lottery generated quasi-random
assignment, difference-in-differences and large-scale ﬁxed effects speciﬁcations, hier-
archical linear modelling (HLM), and structural discreet choice models. As in the
previous section, we highlight the explicit and implicit assumptions regarding the un-
derlying choice framework as they relate to both the identiﬁcation and interpretation
of variable effects. Prior to considering these four topics we describe a model of hous-
ing choice that highlights many of the determinants of family location decisions and
then discuss some general issues related to learning and the accumulation of human
capital. The latter discussion focuses on empirically relevant issues pertinent to much
education research.
735.1 Housing Choice35
Consider the location equilibrium of a household that resides at location d*. Ignoring











where expected utility is accumulated over the relevant planning horizon, H, and the
location, d∗, is chosen once and for all (for simplicity) compared to all d.36 Each
location is associated with a wage wd, preferences for such a location kd, prices pd
(which include house prices), a set of local amenities O and in particular SQ is school
quality. Utility may depend on individual abilities f, that drive wages. They also de-
pend on a vector of household consumption, on labour supply and on demographics,
all of which have all been maximized given location.37 Hence U(.) represents indir-
ect utility given location. Largely static variants of this lie behind general theories of
urban location decisions, the quality of local public services, and the demand for local
government services (cf. Straszheim, 1987; Tiebout, 1956; Wildasin, 1987). In the
simplest models a household optimizes equation 1 across all of the feasible locations
within its choice set given complete information for all periods. Yet lifecycle changes,
unexpected shocks or incorrect predictions move families out of equilibrium and of-
ten lead to relocation. For example, households may decide to relocate because of
changes in expected lifetime income, family structure (additions of children, divorce
or remarriage), perceptions of the quality of local public services including schools,
the distribution of employment opportunities, or other factors. Even in the absence of
prediction error, rising income may reduce borrowing constraints and expand oppor-
tunities. Note further that moving costs introduce inertia into the decisions, so that
at any point in time a household might drift away from its current utility maximising
35This section draws from Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (2004)
36See Kennan and Walker (2009)
37We are being vague about household formation so as not to complicate the notation.
74location and might not move until a time when the utility loss from d∗ compared to the
next best alternative becomes large. A much more complete model of location choice
is developed by Kennan and Walker (2009) and shows the complexity of such decision
making. Developing this in a general equilibrium framework and understanding the in-
teraction between amenities, labour market opportunities and preferences is at the heart
of understanding how individuals end up choosing school quality as a function of pref-
erences and abilities as well as prices. This simple model highlights some of the main
impediments to the estimation of school and teacher effects. First, it is quite difﬁcult
to account for all the factors that lead families to make different location and school
choices. Second, even with panel data to account for student or family ﬁxed effects,
changes sizeable enough to induce geographic moves are likely also to have direct ef-
fects on outcomes. This raises immediate questions about the validity of exogeneity
restrictions in panel data analyses.
5.2 Learning Dynamics
The cumulative nature of knowledge acquisition introduces an additional complication
into the estimation of school and teacher effects, and we now consider speciﬁcation
issues directly related to the modelling of the dynamics of knowledge retention in a
data generating process driven by the multiple dimensions of choices that determine
the distribution of teacher and school characteristics. In order to highlight the speciﬁc-
ation issues related to assumptions regarding the rate of knowledge depreciation we
assume no heterogeneity in school input effects. Equation 49 models the outcome of
student i in year t as a function of a school input S, a vector of control variables X,
a time varying student effect αit that captures unobserved student heterogeneity other
than differences resulting from S and X, and an error term e that represents all other de-
terminants of A including measurement error in the outcome variable and unobserved
75school, community, and family inﬂuences.
Ait = αit +βXit +δSit +eit (49)
The variables X and S have t subscripts, because many studies make use of panel
data that contain multiple measures of family and school variables. In other cases
including research on earnings, earnings in year t are regressed on family and school
characteristics measured during childhood.
If S is orthogonal to α and e estimation of Equation 49 produces consistent es-
timates of δ. In reality, OLS estimation of Equation 49 is unlikely to produce con-
sistent estimates given limited information available and the complex processes that
determine the distribution of school and teacher characteristics. These include 1) fam-
ily location and schooling decisions that are part of the previously discussed process
of life-cycle optimisation of utility; 2) utility maximising choices of schools and dis-
tricts by teachers and other school personnel; 3) purposeful matching of students and
teachers in classrooms; and 4) the political and judicial processes that determine school
ﬁnances and a range of laws that affect the allocation of resources and students among
classrooms, schools, and districts.
Although confounding factors and consequent omitted variables bias tend to be the
primary issue considered in the discussion of the merits of most empirical approaches,
other measurement and speciﬁcation errors also threaten estimation of equation 49. As
we discuss below, complications introduced by test-measurement error have received
considerable attention in studies of teacher and school effects and related policies in-
cluding merit pay and NCLB accountability.38
Another frequently discussed speciﬁcation issue is the appropriate treatment of the
history of family and school inputs given life cycle utility optimisation. As Cunha,
Heckman, and Schennach (2010), Cunha and Heckman (2008), and Todd and Wolpin
38The arbitrary normalisation of test scores also complicates estimation, as monotonic transformations
may lead to very different ﬁndings. Cunha and Heckman (2008) discuss this issue.
76(2003) emphasise, the development of cognitive and non-cognitive skills is a cumulat-
ive and complex process and the failure to account for the history of inputs can lead
to biased estimates of the effects of variables of interest. Limited availability of his-
torical data on parental, school, and community inputs and the endogeneity of parental
inputs impede efforts to estimate the full life-cycle model, leading to the use of lagged
achievement measures and student ﬁxed effects to account for the history of parent,
community, and school input effects. Such methods fail to capture the nuances of skill
development processes involving endogenous parental behaviour in which there appear
to be sensitive periods during childhood for parental investments in both types of skills
(Cunha and Heckman, 2008).
Nonetheless, the value-added and ﬁxed effect methods may account for the aggreg-
ate effects of the history of inputs, and it is informative to examine the implications
of imposing various assumptions on the rate of knowledge depreciation. Therefore
we assume no confounding family or other factors including endogenous responses to
realisedschoolqualityanddescribetheimplicationsofﬁvecommonlyusedapproaches
using a simple model of achievement for student i in grade G in which a constant pro-
portion (1-θ) of knowledge is lost each year (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1), the effect and variance of
SC do not differ across grades, the covariance of SC across grades is constant, and the






First consider an OLS regression of achievement in grade G on SC in grade G
with no control for prior achievement and thus likely to be subject to the inﬂuences
of confounding factors. In this case the error includes effects of all past values of the
school characteristic:
















where ρ is the covariance of the school characteristic in grades i and j that is assumed
not to vary by number of years or grades apart.
In general, the magnitude of any bias depends on both θ and ρ. Not surprisingly,
bias decreases along with the rate of decay and approaches zero as θ approaches zero.
In the special case of random assignment experiments, IV, or other methods that isolate
the component of the school characteristic in grade G that is uncorrelated with the
school characteristic in other grades, this speciﬁcation produces unbiased estimates of
β regardless of θ.
Any correlation between the current and past values of the school characteristic
complicates interpretation of the estimate and limits the generalisability of the ﬁnd-
ings. The estimate would reﬂect some weighted average of current and depreciated
past effects, where the weighting depends upon the often unknown serial correlation
in the school characteristic. Given the substantial demographic differences in school
mobility rates by race, ethnicity, and family income, estimates would tend to be higher
for students in stable schools even if the true effects were either similar for all students
or higher for those in more turbulent environments.40
More compelling approaches use multiple years of test score results to account for
student heterogeneity. One such approach is the student ﬁxed effects model without
a control for lagged achievement. Taking ﬁrst differences of equation 49 (subtracting
AG−1 from AG) to remove any student ﬁxed error component gives:
39Given the assumption that θ is a constant, the expected value can be calculated using the omitted vari-
ables bias formula treating the terms in the summation as a single variable.











E( ˆ βf.e.)=β −βθ/2 (54)
In contrast to the simple levels model, the ﬁxed effect speciﬁcation produces an
estimate of the school characteristic effect that is biased toward zero as long as the
rate of decay (1-θ) does not equal one. Notice that the magnitude of the bias does not
depend upon the value of correlation of the school characteristic across grades, ρ.
A second approach uses prior year test score to account for student heterogeneity
by subtracting it from current year score and using the test score gain as the dependent
variable. This model is a special case of the value added model of test score in grade
g regressed on test score in grade g-1 and the school characteristic in which θ is as-
sumed to equal 1. This model is often preferred to the unrestricted value added model,
because the inclusion of an imprecisely measured lagged endogenous variable as a re-
gressor can introduce other types of speciﬁcation error including errors in variables and
endogeneity bias.42 Here achievement in grade g minus achievement in grade g-1 is
regressed on the school characteristic in grade G.
AiG−AiG−1 = SCGβgain+β ∑
G
g=1(θg−θg−1)SCG−g+error (55)
41Here the term in brackets is treated as the single omitted variable. Notice that the assumption of a
constant covariance regardless of the number of grades between grades i and j mean that the covariance
between (SCG–SCG−1) and SCg equals zero for all values of g less than G-1.
42Numerous studies use test score gain as the dependent variable including Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain
(2005) and Harris and Sass (2009); both papers discuss the model in some detail.
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The magnitude of any bias depends on both θ and ρ. In the case of θ, the problem
is that the violation of the assumption of no knowledge depreciation means that the
higher the lagged score the higher is the over-estimate of expected test score in the
current year. Not surprisingly given the structure of the model, bias decreases as the
true value of θ increases and disappears if there is no loss of knowledge from year to
year, i.e. θ=1. As is the case with the levels model, the use of a value added framework,
random assignment experiments, IV, or other methods that isolate the component of the
school characteristic in grade G that is uncorrelated with the value of the characteristic
in other grades produce unbiased estimates of β regardless of the true value of θ; If
ρ equals zero the error introduced by the mis-speciﬁcation is orthogonal to the school
characteristic and does not introduce bias.
As is the case with the model with lagged achievement, the inclusion of a student
ﬁxed effects does not eliminate the speciﬁcation error to the gains model. Taking ﬁrst
differences of equation 55 (subtracting AG−2 −AG−1 from AG −AG−1) to remove any











43Given the assumption that cov(SCi,SCj)is constant regardless of the number of grades apart, all terms
cancel except for one grade G−1 term and one grade 0 term.
44Given the assumption that cov(SCi,SCj) is constant regardless of the number of grades apart, all terms
80E( ˆ βf.e.gain)=β +β(1−θ)/2 (58)
Similar to the case for levels, bias in the ﬁxed effect in gains speciﬁcation is of
the opposite sign as any bias in the gains model without student ﬁxed effects, and the
magnitude of the bias does not depend upon the value of ρ. Notice that the bias is the
same magnitude but the opposite sign for the two ﬁxed effects models in cases where
θ=0.5.
In summary, this simple education production function model illustrates that the vi-
olation of a strong assumption regarding the rate of knowledge depreciation introduces
bias in ﬁxed effects models regardless of the magnitude of ρ and in models without
ﬁxed effects as long as the magnitude of ρ does not equal zero. This provides some
rationale for the use of models including those with student ﬁxed effects in which the
value of θ is not constrained to equal zero or one.45
Of course the dynamics of non-cognitive and cognitive skill formation necessitate
the use of richer empirical models to control for potentially confounding family and
community inﬂuences. Cunha and Heckman (2008) argue in favour of the use of a
latent variable framework to account for the endogeneity of parental inputs and multi-
plicity of potential proxies for family background. Although their interest in the pat-
tern of family effects differs from our focus on school inputs, the issues of endogenous
parental behaviour and student heterogeneity along multiple dimensions have direct
relevance to the identiﬁcation of school input effects given the possibility of parental
responses to realised teacher quality, class size, and other school inputs and potential
non-random sorting of students into schools and classrooms on the basis of cognitive
and non-cognitive skills.
Another important issue is the scale of the test scores. This is arbitrary and any
cancel except for one grade G-1 term and one grade 0 term.
45Nerlove (1971), Nickell (1981), Arellano and Bond (1991 ) and Hsiao (2003) discusses estimation ﬁxed
effects models with a lagged dependent variable and biases that can arise from within groups estimation.
81monotonic transformation provides the same information. However, this raises two
related issues: ﬁrst there is no reason to expect that linearity and additivity of ﬁxed
effects or other unobservables, such as the one postulated in equations (49, 50, 51 or
55) has to be valid for the particular scale we happen to be working with. Second, the
comparison of changes in test scores is not invariant to monotonic transformations: for
example, the statement that the change in test scores was larger for some group than for
another is not invariant to monotonic transformations of the scores. One way around
this problem is to ﬁnd a natural cardinalisation or anchoring of the test scores.46 This
in itself raises interesting questions, because test scores are an aggregation of answers
to many different questions and also provide the benchmark for the teacher to evaluate
her success. As a result the way test scores are arrived at may affect teacher incent-
ives. Thus suppose for example that test scores were calculated in order to maximise
their predictive power with respect to future wages, academic attainment or other out-
come. Then the objective for teachers could be deﬁned as aligned with such longer
term outcomes, and the scores could be anchored in that metric. This would not elim-
inate complications introduced by non-linearities, but at least it would ﬁx the metric
and deﬁne clearly the meaning of the linearity assumption. The difﬁculty is of course
that we often do not have a clearly measured link between the test scores at hand and
an outcome variable let alone agreement on what that outcome variable should be.
5.3 Estimation of Class Size Effects
Similar to the case of the return to schooling, the beneﬁts of smaller classes may vary
along several dimensions including initial class size, student characteristics, the school
environment, and the nature of the comparison. Yet little of the empirical work on
class size is grounded in a conceptual model of class size effects that points toward
46see Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010)
82particularly types of heterogeneity. Rather analyses typically provide average effects or
effects that differ by demographic group or grade. If there is substantial heterogeneity
in the beneﬁts of smaller classes, samples drawn from different populations would
be expected to produce different estimates of average effects for all students or even
students in a particular demographic group. Estimates would also be expected to differ
on the basis of whether or not the differences in class size used to identify a coefﬁcient
are related to differences in unobserved teacher quality resulting from either teacher
preferences for smaller classes or any expansion in the number of teaching positions
necessary to reduce class size.
We begin this section by outlining a model of the relationship between learning
and class size and then discuss six studies of class size effects that use a range of
methods and types of data. The model allows for heterogeneity by student ability and
thelevelofdisruptivebehaviourinaclassroomandcanincorporategeneralequilibrium
effects resulting from changes in teacher quality. Recent research ﬁnds evidence of
heterogeneous class size effects along the achievement distribution, and Lazear (2001)
highlights differences in the level of disruption as a likely explanation for why lower
income students appear to realise larger beneﬁts from smaller classes.47
5.3.1 Model48
Equation 59 models learning for student i in classroom c in school j as a function
of the amount of classroom time available for learning and the value of that time in
terms of the quality of the teaching and relevance of the material, plus all other student,
community, and school factors:
learningicj = ρ(d)n
cjq(n,a)icj +Xicj (59)
47Ding and Lehrer (2005), Konstantopoulos (2008), and McKee, Rivkin and Sims (2010) all ﬁnd that the
beneﬁts of smaller classes appear to increase with achievement.
48The discussion is drawn from McKee, Rivkin and Sims (2010).
83where ρ is the proportion of time a student is not disrupting the class; d is the classroom
average propensity to disrupt the class; q is the value of a unit of instructional time; n
is class size; a is an index of ability49 and X is a vector of other student, community
and school factors.
The term ρ(d)n
cjis drawn from Lazear (2001) and represents the share of class time
notlosttodisruptionbyanyofthenstudentsintheroom, whilethetermq(n,a)icj mod-
els the value of a unit of instructional time as function of both class size and academic
preparation. Variation in classroom behaviour, d, and academic preparation, a, provide
two dimensions of potential heterogeneity in the beneﬁt of smaller classes. Import-
antly, all students in a classroom experience the same amount of instructional time, but
the value of instructional time may vary by ability due to targeting of the curriculum,
the distribution of teacher effort, and student heterogeneity.
In order to illustrate the ways in which disruption and academic preparation may
affect the beneﬁts from class size reduction, we take the derivative of equation 1 with














Equation 60 illustrates the relationship between the propensity to disrupt class and
the beneﬁt of class size reduction.50 The product of the two relationships in squiggly
brackets determines the sign of the cross-partial derivative of learning with respect to
n and d. The ﬁrst is negative, as the derivative of ρ with respect to d is assumed to be
negative (a higher average propensity to disrupt reduces the share of time available for
learning), while the second is ambiguous and depends on the magnitudes of the various
49Ability represents a one dimensional index of academic skill and is not meant to refer to capture innate
differences.
50The derivative of learning with respect to class size (n) equals [ρ(d)]nln(ρ(d))q(n,a)+[ρ(d)]n ∂q(n,a)
∂n .




∂n is assumed to be negative: the quality of instructional time declines as
class size increases for a number of reasons including more difﬁculty differentiating
the curriculum to account for variation in academic preparation. q(n,a) is positive and
the product of ln(ρ) and n lies between 0 and -1, so nln(ρ)+1 is also positive.51
Thus the relationship between the beneﬁts of class size reduction and the degree of
disruption (d) thus depends upon the magnitudes of two counteracting effects. First, as
Lazear (2001) points out, at lower values of ρ reduced class size has a larger effect on
the share of time available for learning and thus a larger effect on achievement. Second,
at lower values of ρ any improvement in the quality of instruction time due to smaller
classes has a lower overall impact, because classrooms with lower values of ρ have less
time for learning.
Equation 61illustrates the relationship between initial achievement and the beneﬁt
















As is the case with disruption, the relationship between the beneﬁt of class size
reduction and initial achievement cannot be signed a priori in this framework. Here
the sum of the two relationships in squiggly brackets determines the sign of the cross-
partial derivative of learning with respect to n and a. The ﬁrst term, roughly the average
disruption of a single student, is negative, while the ratio can be positive or negative
depending upon the relationship between achievement and the quality of instruction
and the relationship between achievement and the change in the quality of instruction
as class size falls.
In sum, the pattern of heterogeneous effects along both dimensions cannot be pre-
dicted a priori. Moreover, differences in district policies may produce variation across
51At a value of ρ below 0.95, nln(ρ)+1 becomes negative, but at such a low value of ρ the share of class
time available for instruction is well below 50 percent.
85districtsinthedistributionoftreatmenteffectsacrosseachofthesedimensions. Finally,
any accompanying changes in teacher quality may affect both the quality of instruction
and level of disruption per student (changes in teacher skill at managing the classroom),
and any such affects may vary by school characteristics.
5.3.2 Discussion of Empirical Analyses
Table 5.3.2 lists the six studies that we consider and describes their methods, data, and
ﬁndings. The studies use a range of empirical methods to account for potential con-
founding factors including controls for observables, regression discontinuity, and ﬁxed
effects, and various types of administrative, survey, experimental data. Importantly,
these different approaches also alter the interpretation of the parameter estimates.
Pong and Pallas (2001) use TIMSS data on the mathematics achievement of 13
year olds in nine countries to estimate the effects of class size on achievement and the
degree to which curriculum and classroom instruction mediate those effects. In order
to explicitly account for the multi-level structure of the data that has test score and
family background measured at the individual level and class size and other school
characteristics measured at the school level, the paper uses hierarchical linear model-
ling (henceforth HLM) estimation methods52 The inclusion of a random school effect
in the empirical model accounts for the fact that class size is a school level variable.
The results reveal little evidence of a signiﬁcant negative relationship between class
size and achievement in any of the countries; in fact the class size coefﬁcients are as
likely to be positive as negative. Note that the study does not account for student het-
erogeneity explicitly with either student ﬁxed effects or measures of prior achievement,
and it includes only a handful of family characteristics as controls. The fact that the in-
clusion of a small number of other school level variables tends to reduce the magnitude
52.See Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) for a comprehensive description of HLM including two and three
level random effects models.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































87of the positive coefﬁcients provides evidence that confounding variables introduce up-
ward bias. Moreover, the cross-sectional estimator used in this analysis in combination
with the local nature of teacher labor markets means that class size effects capture any
related differences in teacher quality: teacher quality may be lower in schools with
smaller classes because of the need to hire additional teachers, or teacher quality may
behigherinschoolswithsmallerclassesbecausehigherwealthcommunitiescanafford
both smaller classes and higher teacher salaries.
Although the random effects provide a standard error correction to the clustering of
students in schools, the validity of random effects models in general and HLM models
asaspecialcaserestsintheassumptionoforthogonalitybetweentheincludedvariables
and random effects. Given the limited number of covariates and multiple dimensions
of choices that generate the distribution of class size, this assumption is likely to be
violated in this case. Fixed effects provides an alternative to random effects that does
not require the orthogonality assumption, but ﬁxed effects do not provide a plausible
approach in this case because of the absence of class size variation within schools and
the assumption of linearity.53
Dearden, Ferri, and Meghir (2002) use rich longitudinal data that follow all subjects
living in Great Britain who were born during the week of March 3-9, 1958 to estimate
the effects of the pupil-teacher ratio at age 11 and at age 16 on educational attainment
and wages for men and women. Equation 62 models log wage as a function of a
time varying student effect α that captures unobserved differences among students, a
vector X of family and community characteristics, the primary and secondary school
pupil teacher ratios PPT and SPT, other included components of school and peer group
quality in primary and secondary school PS and SS, and a random error.
53Blundell and Windmeijer (1997) show that the random and ﬁxed effect multilevel estimators are equival-
ent when group sizes (in this case number of students per school) are large. However, the number of students
in classrooms and schools is not large enough to eliminate the bias introduced by correlation between the
random effects and included variables.
88wiy = αiy+βXiy+δpPPTi+δsSPTi+λpPSi+λsSSi+eiy (62)
If the two pupil teacher ratio variables were uncorrelated with e and α, OLS would
yield unbiased estimates of δp and δs. But as noted above, the endogeneity of family
choice of school and the dependence of school ﬁnance on a number of factors in-
cluding family demographics in combination with existing evidence on peer, teacher,
and school effects on achievement strongly suggest that typically available variables
contained in X and S will not account adequately for potentially confounding factors,
thereby introducing bias into OLS estimates of δp and δs based on cross-sectional data.
However, the array of test results available in the longitudinal data along with of ex-
tensive information on schools and communities permits the inclusion of both earlier
test scores as controls for unobserved heterogeneity α and a set of school and com-
munity variables to account for potentially confounding factors captured by the error.54
In addition, the use of the pupil-teacher ratio at the school level rather than the size of
individual classes circumvents potential bias introduced by the purposeful allocation of
students into classes. Although a portion of the between school variation in the pupil-
teacher ratio results from differences in the numbers of special education teachers and
additional ﬁnancing for disadvantaged populations, the included test scores and school
variables should account for much of the variation in school circumstances.
It is not possible to prove that even an extensive set of controls fully accounts for all
confounding factors. Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) discuss selection on observables
and unobservables and develop an informal method for assessing the probability that
selection on unobservables introduces substantial bias. In this case the estimates show
little sensitivity to changes in the speciﬁcations, suggesting that selection on unobserv-
ables is unlikely to introduce substantial bias.
Error in the measurement of the pupil-teacher ratio provides an additional poten-
54This approach is a form of matching on observable characteristics.
89tial source of bias in many studies such as this where there is only a single snapshot
of school characteristics to represent the school environment for a number of years.
The use of a class size in a particular grade likely introduces attenuation bias, though
the similar limitations in the measurement of controls also introduce bias that may
amplify or offset the bias resulting from the measurement of class size. Given the
relatively small size of the sample and noisiness of the wage measure, it may be dif-
ﬁcult to identify small but educationally and economically meaningful effects such as
the effects of the pupil-teacher ratio on educational attainment which are insigniﬁcant
statistically but large enough to be meaningful for education policy.
In terms of interpretation, the use of pupil-teacher ratio does introduce some un-
certainty, as reduction achieved through the addition of special education or interven-
tion teachers is likely to produce a different effect on average achievement and have
different implications for the educational attainment and earnings distributions than a
reduction brought about by the hiring of additional classroom teachers. Therefore the
estimate captures differences of the type experienced by students in the March, 1958
cohort. If a lower pupil-teacher ratio increases the supply of teacher quality, the estim-
ated beneﬁt of smaller classes will incorporate class size induced differences in teacher
quality given the absence of information on teachers.
Concerns about omitted variables bias even in rich speciﬁcations have contributed
to the expanded use of instrumental variable and ﬁxed effect methods to account for
unobserved inﬂuences. Card and Krueger (1992) provide a prominent example of an
analysis with little or no information on family background that uses ﬁxed effects for
both the state of birth and state of residence to account for unobserved inﬂuences on
earnings that could contaminate estimates of the pupil-teacher effect on the return to
schooling. The two step procedure begins by estimating separate returns to educa-
tion for each cohort-state combination from a regression of log(wage) on state of birth
dummyvariables, stateofresidencedummyvariables, educationbyregioninteractions,
90and separate education variables for each cohort-state of birth combination. Then the
coefﬁcients on the separate education terms are regressed on the cohort-state average
pupil-teacher ratio, the cohort-state average teacher salary, and the cohort-state average
school year length. Note that the use of cohort average school characteristics mitigates
the measurement error introduced by a single snapshot, though any heterogeneity in
class size effects by grade raises questions about the interpretation of coefﬁcients on
characteristics that aggregate information across elementary and secondary grades.
The ﬁxed effects model uses inter-state movers and within state variation over time
in school inputs to identify variable effects. Three key assumptions underlying the
analysis are 1) school quality affects earnings via the return to education only; 2) se-
lective migration does not contaminate the estimates; and 3) unobserved school or
community factors are not related to the pupil-teacher ratio. Betts (1995) and Heck-
man, Layne-Farrar, and Todd (1996) raise questions about the ﬁrst assumption, and
Heckman, Layne-Farrar, and Todd (1996) document evidence of selective migration.55
In terms of Equation 62, selective migration introduces bias by leading to a correlation
between unobserved heterogeneity (represented by α in Equation 62) and the school
quality measures thereby violating the exogeneity condition required for identiﬁcation.
Finally, Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor (1996) ﬁnd that the use of information ag-
gregated to the state level affects the magnitude of omitted variables bias. In terms of
Equation 62, the omission of relevant variables introduces a correlation between the
school quality measures and the error which would violate the exogeneity condition
required for identiﬁcation. Aggregation may dampen or exacerbate any speciﬁcation
error depending upon the structure of the covariance between the omitted variable, the
school variable of interest and the outcome. For example, if the omitted factors were to
vary only at the level of aggregation (such as would be the case if these are state policy
factors) and the factors were positively related to school quality and negatively related
55Betts (1995) investigates the effect of school resources using the NLSY and fails to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
relationship between wages and the pupil-teacher ratio for various parameterisation of the pupil-teacher ratio
effect.
91to class size, aggregation would tend to amplify the omitted variables bias. Note that
the oft-asserted concern that aggregate measures of school inputs introduce measure-
ment error, because of the difference between actual school values and the state average
is incorrect regardless of whether data are aggregated to the level of aggregation of the
school input measures. Rather aggregation alters the variation used to identify the es-
timates and does not introduce bias if the relationship between the outcome and input
are linear and there are no other speciﬁcation errors.56
This paper also uses the pupil-teacher ratio and therefore the estimates provide in-
formation ondifferences produced by similarunderlying variation in instructional staff.
However, changes in the number and potentially the quality of teachers likely accom-
pany state average changes in the pupil-teacher ratio, conditional on salary. There-
fore these estimates capture both the direct beneﬁt of a lower pupil-teacher ratio and
any offsetting effects resulting from the expansion of the teaching force, the latter of
which almost certainly depends upon labor market factors speciﬁc to the place and time
period.
In contrast to the earnings papers that relate school inputs in childhood to earnings
as an adult, the three achievement analyses investigate the effects of class size on end
of year achievement. In order to account for unobserved school and neighbourhood
factors and student differences, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) model test score
gain as a function of class size, teacher experience and education, family characterist-
ics, and full sets of student, school by year, and in some cases school by grade ﬁxed
effects. Equations 63 and 64 divide this model in two in order to highlight the school
ﬁxed effects:
AiGst −AiG−1,s￿,t−1 = SCGstβgain+αi+eiGst (63)
eiGst = ωs+ξG+ψt +ρGt +πsG+ϕst +τsGt +εiGst (64)
56Theil (1954) examines aggregation in a linear framework.
92where SC is a vector of the school characteristics and α is a student ﬁxed effect. Equa-
tion 64 decomposes the error term into a number of school, grade, and year components
and a random error. The ﬁrst three terms are ﬁxed school (ω ), grade (ξ ), and year (ψ
) effects, the next three terms (ρ,π, ϕ ) are second level interactions among these three
components, the seventh term (τ) is the third level interaction, and the ﬁnal term ( ε) is
a random error.
The school ﬁxed effect (ω) captures time invariant differences in neighbourhoods
and schools, many of which are likely related to both achievement and school racial
composition. These include school facilities, public services, community type, and
working conditions that inﬂuence teacher supply. The grade, year, and year-by-grade
ﬁxed effects ( ξ,ψ,ρ) account for statewide trends in class size and achievement by
grade and year and other factors including changes in test difﬁculty.
Because school quality may vary over time and by grade for each school, Equation
64 also includes interactions between school and both grade and year. The school-
by-grade component (π) captures any systematic differences across grades in a school
that are common to all years, and the school-by-year ( ϕ) term accounts for systematic
year-to-year differences that are common to all grades in a school. The school-by-
grade ﬁxed effects account for school or district speciﬁc inﬂuences on the quality of
instruction that might vary by grade such as curriculum or information technology.
The school-by-year ﬁxed effects remove in a very general way not only school spe-
ciﬁc performance trends but also idiosyncratic variation over time in school adminis-
tration and in neighbourhood and local economic conditions that likely affect mobility
patterns including such things as the introduction of school policies or local economic
or social shocks. For example, an economic shock that reduces neighbourhood em-
ployment and income is absorbed and will not bias the estimates; nor will a shock to
local school ﬁnances or the quality of the local school board, because each of these
would affect all grades in a school.
93The seventh term, τ, is the full three-way interaction between school, grade, and
year; it cannot be included in the estimation, because there would be no variation left in
class size across time or grades. Ignoring this three-way interaction means that grade
speciﬁc variation over time in school average teacher quality or other achievement
determinants could potentially bias the estimates if also correlated with class size. Yet
the non-trivial costs of switching schools, the presence of multiple children in a family,
and the fact that teacher assignments and other relevant aspects of school decisions are
typically not known until immediately prior to the beginning of school year reduces the
likelihood that changes over time in school and teacher quality for speciﬁc grades are
systematically linked with yearly changes in class size through parental behavioural
responses.
In this framework, the remaining variation in class size comes from differences
across classrooms at point in time and differences in the pattern of grade average
class sizes experienced by adjacent cohorts in a school that come from changes in
policy regarding the allocation of resources among grades, students movement among
schools and natural demographic variations in cohort composition. In terms of differ-
ences across classrooms, the potential for non-random allocation of students such as
the placement of more difﬁcult to educate students in smaller classes raises concerns
about the validity of such variation, and the use of grade average class size in this study
avoids the introduction of selection bias from this channel. In terms of differences in
the pattern of grade average class size among adjacent cohorts, an identifying assump-
tion in a number of studies that make use of cohort differences is that either raw cohort
differences or differences remaining following the removal of school speciﬁc trends
over time are not correlated with confounding factors. This approach builds on the
intuition that students close in age in the same school have many similar experiences
including similar quality teachers. Therefore this structure identiﬁes the ceteris paribus
class size effect, holding constant other school factors.
94Despite the multiple levels of school ﬁxed effects, unobserved student heterogen-
eity might introduce bias, possibly through the linkages between academic preparation
and either the number of new entrants or cohort size. The use of achievement gain as
dependent variable and inclusion of student ﬁxed effects should, however, account for
differences related to both student movement among schools and enrolment differences
among adjacent cohorts.
Although the ﬁxed effect in gains speciﬁcation accounts for primary confounding
factors, the use of achievement gain as dependent variable in a student ﬁxed effects
model biases the coefﬁcients away from zero as discussed above. Moreover, the mul-
tiple ﬁxed effects likely exacerbate any error in the measurement of class size, and the
estimates are sensitive to the elimination of observations with class size values that ap-
pear to be incorrect. Finally, the exogeneity assumption that the remaining errors are
orthogonal to class size may be violated if within school differences in class size across
cohorts are related to unobserved differences in teacher quality or time varying student
factors that affect achievement.
Angrist and Lavy (1999) use a regression discontinuity, instrumental variables ap-
proach based on Maimonides Law to identify class size effects on 4th and 5th grade
achievement in Israel. Regression Discontinuity (RD) is a quasi-experimental method
that uses a discontinuity in the probability of treatment to identify the local average
treatment effect (LATE) and avoid bias introduced by non-random selection into treat-
ment. Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) describe identiﬁcation conditions and
estimation using an RD design, and we review their work prior to discussing the An-
grist and Lavy estimates of class size effects.






where y0i is the outcome without treatment and y1i is the outcome with treatment.
Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw begin by considering the case of a homogeneous
treatment effect where βi = β. Let z take on a continuum of values where the condi-
tional probability
f(z)=E[xi|zi = z]=Pr[xi = 1|zi = z] (66)
is discontinuous at zi = z0. Note that this is commonly referred to as a fuzzy RD
design where other unobserved variables also affect the probability of treatment; the
sharp design can be treated as a special case in which assignment to treatment is a
deterministic function of z.
The key assumption required for identiﬁcation is that E[αi|zi = z], is continuous in
z at z0, which is justiﬁed by the belief that persons close to the threshold are similar.
The authors prove that β is non-parametrically identiﬁed as long as this assumption
holds, the positive and negative limits for the probability of treatment exist at z0, and
the probability of treatment is discontinuous at z0.
Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw turn next to identiﬁcation when treatment ef-
fects are heterogeneous. They ﬁrst prove that the local average treatment effect at z0
is non-parametrically identiﬁed if the assumptions from the constant treatment effect
case outlined in the previous paragraph are satisﬁed, the average treatment effect at zi,
E[βi|zi = z], is continuous at z0, and xi is independent of βi conditional on zi near z0.
The authors point out that the assumption that xi is independent of βi conditional on
96zi near z0 assumes that the anticipated gains from treatment do not affect the probab-
ility of receiving treatment, a strong assumption that may well be violated in practice.
Therefore the authors, drawing from Imbens and Angrist (1994), establish the identi-
ﬁcation of the local average treatment effect at z0 under an alternative set of conditions
that allows selection into treatment on the basis of prospective gains without the strong
assumption of conditional independence. Speciﬁcally, they consider the case where
treatment assignment is a deterministic function of z for each observation i, but the
function is different for different groups or persons. Given this supposition, Hahn,
Todd, and Van der Klaauw describe the speciﬁc assumptions necessary for identiﬁca-
tion of the local average treatment effect at z0.
The authors then turn to estimation and propose the use of local linear nonpara-
metric regression (LLR) methods rather than standard kernel estimators based on work
by Fan (1992) showing that the LLR estimator has better boundary properties than the
standard kernel estimator. They derive the asymptotic distribution of the RD treatment
effect estimator based on LRR in the Appendix to the paper.
We now turn back to the class size application of RD based on Maimonides Law.
This rule prohibits class sizes larger than forty, meaning that if schools desire to have
class size of at least forty an increase in enrolment from 40 to 41 reduces average class
size from 40 to 20.5, and increase in enrolment from 80 to 81 reduces average class size
from 40 to 27, and so on. The authors argue that the use of predicted class size based on
the rule as an instrument for class size along with ﬂexible controls for enrolment effects
produces consistent estimates of class size effects on 4th and 5th grade achievement,
and the pattern of observed class sizes largely corresponds to that which would be
predicted by Maimonides Law. As is the case with the study by Rivkin, Hanushek
and Kain (2005), these estimates are aimed at capturing the pure effect of smaller
classes holding all other factors constant. In this case the estimates can be interpreted
as weighted averages of local average treatment effects across the various boundaries,
97where the weights reﬂect the numbers of schools that contribute to identiﬁcation by
having enrolment that places it at a particular boundary.
There are reasons to be concerned that the identiﬁcation conditions described in
Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw (2001) could be violated. First, the paper shows
that many schools add classes prior to enrolment reaching a multiple of forty, and
districts may manipulate enrolment among schools in order to comply with the rule.
Consequently the assumption that expected achievement in the absence of the small
class is continuous at the boundary may be violated, as schools with enrolments just
above boundaries may differ systematically from those just below. Moreover, the basic
models combine the effects of changes in class size around the boundaries and intra-
boundary changes, and intra-boundary class size variation may well be correlated with
unobserved determinants of achievement. Restricting identiﬁcation to comparisons
across boundaries by limiting the sample to schools with enrolment that is ﬁrst within
ﬁve students and then within three students of a boundary leads to ﬂuctuation in the
estimates, and the increasingly small samples also reduce precision. Moreover, such
selection may be endogenous because of the way the system is actually administered
in practice.
In contrast to the other four papers based on observational data, Krueger (1999)
uses data generated by a random assignment experiment designed to uncover the be-
neﬁts of smaller classes. In an ideal experiment in which both students and teachers
were randomly assigned to class types, mean achievement comparisons between treat-
ment and control groups would produce unbiased estimates, and family background,
teacher, and school information could be included to reduce sampling error. However,
non-random movement between treatment and control groups and non-random attri-
tion from the sample potentially introduces selection bias. Although the use of initial
random assignment as an instrument for actual class type can produce LATE estim-
ates, subject to the monotonicity assumption, selective attrition provides a more vexing
98problem.
Similar to the two other class size papers, the Tennessee STAR experiment is de-
signed to produce estimates of the direct beneﬁt of smaller classes ignoring any change
in the quality of instruction. This potentially diverges from the beneﬁt that would be
realised in a large-scale class size reduction that requires substantial expansion of the
teaching force.57
5.4 Estimation of Teacher Value-Added
The passage of No Child Left Behind its requirement that states test students annually
and build comprehensive data systems has expanded opportunities to estimate teacher
productivity as measured by value-added to student achievement. The repeated test
scores and tracking of students and teachers through time enable researchers to ac-
count for differences among students and schools that could impede efforts to identify
teacher value-added. In this section we examine methods used to estimate teacher
value added in ﬁve papers listed in Table 3. The ﬁrst four estimate effectiveness for
each teacher using regression models that account for potential confounding factors in
different ways, while the ﬁnal paper estimates the variance in teacher quality on the
basis of the pattern of school average achievement.
Despitethestepstakentoaccountforconfoundingfactorsintheseandotherpapers,
Rothstein (2009) and others have begun to raise concerns about the methods used to
measure teacher quality. These critiques argue that sorting on unobservables that vary
over time, endogenous parental response to teacher quality, test measurement error, and
other failings introduce bias to estimates of teacher value added and estimates of the
variance in teacher value added.
57Jepsen and Rivkin (2009) estimate the effects of changes in teacher experience and certiﬁcation that
accompanied class size reduction in California, but a lack of data impedes efforts to learn more about the
magnitude, timing, and distribution of any decline in teacher quality.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































100In order to highlight the issues of bias and sampling error that are addressed in
each of these papers, Equation67 decomposes the estimate of teacher value-added for
teacher j in year y as the sum of the true teacher effect (assumed not to vary over time),
the confounding student contribution (subscript i), the confounding peer contribution
(subscript p), the confounding school contribution (subscript s), and random sampling
error (subscript n):
ˆ tjy =tj + ˆ εiy+ ˆ εpy+ ˆ εsy+ ˆ εny (67)
Estimates of teacher value added deviate from the true teacher effect, but if the ex-
pected values of each of the four error terms are zero unobserved differences in student,
peer, and school characteristics would not introduce bias. Regardless, the variance of
ˆ tjy incorporatesthetruevarianceinteacherqualityplusthevariancesoftheotherterms.
Thus estimation of the variance in teacher value added must address complications re-
lated to both bias and sampling error, and the methods frame the interpretation of the
estimates.
Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007) use lagged achievement and observed char-
acteristics to account for unobserved student heterogeneity and school ﬁxed effects to
control for school and peer differences that would otherwise be captured by the teacher
effects; experience controls are not included, meaning that the estimated effects com-
bine ﬁxed differences across teachers and differences related to experience. The school
ﬁxed effects are omitted from some models, because in addition to accounting for con-
founding school factors they also soak up any systematic sorting by quality of teachers
into schools. Importantly, the school ﬁxed effects do not mitigate bias resulting from
sorting into classrooms on the basis of unobserved time varying or even ﬁxed differ-
ences in the rate of learning not captured by the included lagged achievement measures.
Rockoff (2004) takes a different approach to accounting for unobserved heterogen-
eity; he includes student ﬁxed effects but not measures of prior achievement, implicitly
101imposing the strong assumption of no knowledge depreciation over time. He also in-
cludes school by year ﬁxed effects to eliminate any between school variation including
systematic differences in teacher quality. Finally, he controls for teacher experience in
order to isolate ﬁxed differences in teacher effectiveness.
Ballou, Sanders, and Wright (2004) use a sequential process to estimate teacher ef-
fects purged of the inﬂuence of student heterogeneity. First, they regress test score gain
on a vector of student characteristics and teacher ﬁxed effects separately by grade and
subject. Rather than simply treating the estimated teacher ﬁxed effects as estimates of
teacher quality in a particular subject and grade, they combine information from differ-
ent subjects and grades in order to produce a single quality estimate for each teacher.
This is accomplished in the following steps: 1) use the student demographic variable
coefﬁcients obtained from the teacher ﬁxed effect models to subtract the contributions
of the student variables from test score gain; and 2) use the variance/covariance struc-
ture of teacher average residual test score gains for all grades and subjects to produce
a single quality estimate for each teacher. Note that although the use of teacher ﬁxed
effects in the ﬁrst stage eliminates bias introduced by sorting into classrooms on the
basis of the included variables, omitted student factors introduce bias if students sort
into schools or classrooms on the basis of unobserved factors.
The authors claim that the insensitivity of the estimates to the inclusion of the
student covariates provides evidence that the use of multiple tests accounts for the con-
founding effects of unobserved heterogeneity, but this ﬁnding is not surprising given
that the limited set of covariates explains little of the achievement variation within
classrooms, accounts for little of the heterogeneity among students, and may well be
unrelated to unobserved confounding variables. The strong implicit assumptions about
the nature of sorting among schools and classrooms, about the contributions of school
andpeereffects, aboutthecovarianceofteachereffectivenessacrosssubjectsandyears,
and about manner through which knowledge accumulates through time are unlikely to
102be satisﬁed, and this may introduce substantial bias. The fact that the estimates were far
more sensitive to the introduction of peer characteristics than to student level controls
suggests that unobserved school differences and systematic student sorting by school
may present particular problems.
Recognising the threat of student sorting both within and between schools to the
estimation of teacher value-added, Kane and Staiger (2008) use experimental data gen-
erated by a random assignment study of the National Board for Professional Teaching
Standards Certiﬁcation Program to investigate the validity of non-experimental estim-
ates of teacher value-added. In the study, pairs of teachers are identiﬁed in each school,
one with and the other without certiﬁcation, and classrooms are randomly assigned to
the pairs. The difference in average test scores of the classrooms is regressed on the
difference in Empirical Bayes estimates of value added for the pair of teachers based
on multiple years of data from earlier years in order to examine the validity of the
estimation based on non-experimental data.58 The hypothesis test is based on the es-
timate of β in the regression of average achievement in teacher j’s classroom on VA,
the empirical Bayes value-added estimate for teacher j:
¯ A = βVAj +εp (68)
It is the structure of the empirical Bayes estimator that underlies the hypothesis test.



















Note that the bars in the numerator indicate that the terms capture the persistent
components of individual, peer, and school variation among teachers.59 Thus the mag-
nitude of a determines the extent to which the estimate for teacher j is shrunk toward
58See Morris (1983) for a discussion of the empirical Bayes estimator.
59To simplify we set the covariances among the individual, peer, and school factors equal to zero.
103the grand mean teacher quality of zero: the lower the ratio of the persistent components
to the total variance the more the estimate is shrunk toward zero.


























If there were no persistent differences in student, peer, or school components across
teachers not accounted for in the model, then all terms following σ2
t would equal 0, and
the ratio would equal 1. This suggests a test of the null hypothesis of β=1 as a spe-
ciﬁcation test: rejection of the null hypothesis would provide evidence in support of
the presence of non-random sorting on unobservables. Kain and Staiger report estim-
ates that range from roughly 0.75 to 1.1 in their preferred speciﬁcations that control
for student heterogeneity with lagged test scores. Importantly, none of these estimates
are signiﬁcantly different from one, which is consistent with the hypothesis that sort-
ing on unobservables does not confound the estimates of teacher value-added based on
observational data.
It should be noted that the test does have some limitations. First, given the small
sample size, even if the 95 or even 90 percent conﬁdence interval for β contains 1, it
also contains values that are much smaller than one that would be evidence of sorting
on unobservables. Second, if there is compensatory assignment of better teachers to
more difﬁcult students, the covariance terms would be negative and would offset some
of the persistent variation in student, school, or peer differences among teachers not
captured by the model, potentially pushing the estimate toward 1. Finally, the small
group of schools in which principals agreed to permit classes to be randomly assigned
to teachers is unlikely to be representative, meaning that evidence of the validity of
104value-added estimates with this sample may not generalise beyond this sample.
The ﬁnal paper by Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) avoids the question of sort-
ing within classrooms altogether by focusing on cohort differences in achievement
gains within schools. Speciﬁcally, the approach builds on the notion that if schools
select teachers from a pool with substantial variation in quality, higher teacher turnover
should lead to larger differences in test score gains between adjacent cohorts as fewer
students in a cohort have a teacher who also taught the other cohort. Equation 71 rep-
resents average achievement gain in grade g in school s for cohort c as an additive
function of grade average student and teacher ﬁxed effects, a school ﬁxed effect and
the grade average error:
¯ ∆Ac




Taking the difference between adjacent cohorts c and c’ in the differences of grade
average gains in achievement in grades g and g-1 for the sample of students who remain
in the school in both grades eliminates all ﬁxed student and family differences, leaving
only cohort-to-cohort differences in the grade average difference in teacher quality
and time varying student and school factors (contained in υ) as determinants of the






































Squaring this difference yields a natural characterisation of the observed achievement
differences between cohorts as a series of terms that reﬂect variances and covariances
of the separate teacher effects plus a catchall component e that includes all random
























































Under assumptions that formally characterise the notion that teachers are drawn from
common distributions over the restricted time period of the cohort and grade observa-



























is the covariance in
teacher quality across cohorts in a school.
Equation (74) provides the basis for estimation of the within-school variance of
teacher quality over the sample of students that remain in the same school for both
grades. The left-hand side is the squared divergence of the grade pattern in gains across
cohorts, which is regressed on the proportion of teachers in a school who are different
in cohort c’ than in cohort c. In order to account for differences in the number of
teachers and place all schools on a common metric, the proportion different must be
divided by the number of teachers per grade, and the coefﬁcient on this proportion
divided by four provides the estimate of the within-school variance in teacher quality.
Only unobserved, time-varying factors systematically related to teacher turnover can
introduce bias, and sensitivity testing suggests that any such biases are negligible.
As previously noted, the use of test score gain likely introduces some upward bias,
106though violation of the strong assumption that true teacher effectiveness never varies
over time and errors in the measurement of both the number of teachers in a grade and
turnover both bias the estimates toward zero. Moreover, the estimates based on this
approach ignore all between school differences in the quality of instruction. Finally,
a limitation of this aggregate approach for policy is the absence of estimates of value-
added estimates for individual teachers.
Finallytheissueofscaleforthetestscoresreappearsinthisliterature. Manystudies
of teacher value added rely on a speciﬁc test score scale and are based on comparing
gains, which are not invariant to monotonic transformations. Moreover, the empirical
strategy of differencing out heterogeneity relies on the assumption of linearity for the
particular score at hand. This issue raises questions about the robustness of the results
to changes of scale and merits attention during sensitivity testing given the absence of
an agreed upon metric to anchor the results. Moreover, this concern supports the use
of more ﬂexible parameterisation of prior achievement as controls.
One source of bias for all approaches to the estimation of teacher value-added or the
variance in teacher quality is the endogenous intervention of parents and schools. Todd
and Wolpin (2003) and Dearden, Ferri, and Meghir (2002) discuss the likelihood that
the amount of time and money dedicated to academic support is likely to depend on the
quality of instruction. Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006) ﬁnd mixed evidence regarding
theeffectofwinningalotterytochoiceintoaspeciﬁcschoolonparentinvolvement, but
individual teacher quality may induce a stronger parental response. Though inspiring
teachers can potentially induce parents to become more involved, parental intervention
to compensate for lower quality instruction is more likely. In addition to inﬂuencing
parental behaviour, teacher quality may also affect the amount of intervention support
allocated by the school. For example, reading or mathematics specialists may spend
additional time in classrooms with less effective teachers.
Such compensatory intervention by school staff and parents would tend to bias
107value-added estimates toward the school mean and estimates of the within school vari-
ance in teacher quality toward zero due to the negative correlation between teacher
quality on the one hand and both the school and parent components on the other. Even
the random assignment of classrooms to teachers does not mitigate the impact of this
type of endogenous response to realised quality, and any such biases would not be
detected in the speciﬁcation test proposed by Kane and Staiger (2008). Therefore in
the absence of controls for parental and school interventions such as the quantity and
quality of family and school support in speciﬁc subjects, teacher value-added estim-
ates capture both classroom teacher effects and the contributions of other sources of
academic support.
5.5 Estimation of the housing market capitalisation of school qual-
ity
The belief that the quality and cost-effectiveness of local public schools affect hous-
ing values provides a key underpinning for the notion that competition among loc-
alities fosters higher quality public services; this issue is the focus of Chapter ? in
this volume. Yet the non-random sorting of families into communities, multitude of
public services provided, and difﬁculty controlling for all housing and neighbourhood
amenities impede efforts to empirically test the relationship between housing prices
and school quality. Recent work has attempted to overcome these difﬁculties by focus-
ing on comparisons of houses on opposite sides of school attendance zone boundaries.
The validity of school quality capitalisation models with boundary ﬁxed effects rests in
large part on the assumption that unobserved determinants of housing prices vary con-
tinuously at the boundary and are virtually uncorrelated with school quality differences
between houses on opposite sides of the boundary. This is the continuity assumption
described in Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001). If it is satisﬁed, differences
108in school quality would account for any discontinuity in housing prices at the school
attendance zone or school district boundary, and boundary ﬁxed effects models would
generate consistent estimates of the relationship between measured school quality and
price at the boundary.
Table 4 lists three papers that utilise somewhat different boundary ﬁxed effect mod-
els. Despite their differences, each ﬁnds that accounting for unobserved neighbourhood
differences substantially reduces the estimated relationship between house price and
school average test score. Although remaining concerns about bias introduced by un-
observed differences in housing quality, the characteristics of immediate neighbours or
the quality of other amenities remains an important issue, a key methodological ques-
tion is what exactly underlies any relationship between the measures of school quality
and the house price.
Black (1999) calculates differences in mean house prices on opposite sides of
school attendance zone boundaries and investigates whether the differences, are sys-
tematically related to the differences in test scores in the respective schools, adjusted
for a set of observed housing characteristics. Only boundaries in which both attend-
ance zones lie in the same city and school district are included, so this method holds
constant the property tax rate, district administration, the quality of city public services,
and other amenities that do not vary within the narrow boundaries. The focus on close
neighbours also has the advantage of accounting for the effects of factors that change
over space such as proximity to parks, police and ﬁre stations, and public transporta-
tion.
Onepotentialthreattotheidentiﬁcationofthecapitalisedvalueofhighertestscores
is the possibility that the parsimonious set of housing variables fail to capture quality
differences that may be related to test scores; higher income families may both select
the house in the higher test score zone and spend more on home renovation, introducing
an upward bias in the estimate of the capitalised value of higher scores. Any failure
109Table 4: Selected Research on Boundary Fixed Effect Estimates of Housing Market




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































110of the included characteristics to capture dimensions of housing quality that are related
to school average test score including the demographic characteristics of neighbours
will lead to a non-zero within boundary covariance between the error and test score
and introduce bias. The direction of the bias would likely be negative if unobserved
housing quality were higher on the low test score side of the boundary, consistent with
heterogeneous preferences regarding education, and would likely be positive if higher
income households tended to live in the higher test score side of boundaries.
An important limitation of this approach is the inability to disentangle the contri-
butions of peers from that of the quality of the provision of public education per tax
dollar spent. The restriction that boundaries lay within as opposed to between school
districts mitigates biases potentially introduced by confounding factors across district
boundaries at a cost of eliminating any impact of district policies or resource use on
house prices. As the district controls principal and staff hiring, curricular decisions,
capital investments this is a major drawback, making it more likely that student demo-
graphic characteristics play a primary role in the determination of the desirability of an
attendance zone.
Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) embed a boundary ﬁxed effects approach
in a model of neighbourhood choice using restricted U.S. Census data that provides
richer information on the characteristics of neighbours. The ﬁnding that the inclusion
of neighbourhood socio-demographic characteristics roughly cuts in half the estimated
effect of school average test score even in models with rich controls for average student
characteristics suggests that some of what appears to be preference for school or peer
quality is actually a preference for neighbour demographics. Importantly, average test
score is likely to be a poor proxy for school effectiveness in raising achievement, and a
more accurate measure of school value-added would likely provide a clearer picture of
the value placed on more effective schools.
The difference in neighbourhood characteristics on opposite sides of the boundar-
111ies suggests the existence of heterogeneous preferences regarding education, and this
is precisely what is shown by the structural estimation of willingness to pay for school
quality and other neighbourhood characteristics. The discrete choice model incorpor-
ates heterogeneity in the willingness to pay for higher test scores and other house char-
acteristics and neighbourhood amenities. It should be noted that the focus on within
district comparison of attendance zones prevents differences in district quality from
being capitalised into higher house prices in both the hedonic price and discrete choice
regressions.
The additional structure requires the satisfaction of a number of assumptions in-
cluding 1) place of work is exogenous; 2) housing characteristics more than three miles
from any house have no direct effect on the residents; 3) the included neighbourhood
characteristics account fully for sorting across boundaries; 4) school average test scores
and other school characteristics control fully for differences in school quality; and 5)
the multinomial logit IIA assumptions. Concerns can be raised by each of these as-
sumptions, but the underlying assumption of no variation in the weighting of different
aspects of school quality merits additional attention in a framework that emphasises
heterogeneity in preferences. The possibility of variation in the quality of instructing
students from different points in the achievement distribution or different backgrounds
cannot be dismissed, and this model may misinterpret that as differences in willingness
to pay for an amenity whose quality does not vary by student or family characteristics.
Gibbons, Machin, and Silva (2009) use boundary ﬁxed effect hedonic models to es-
timate capitalised values of both school effectiveness, as measured by test score gain,
and school composition, as measured by initial test score, for a sample of United King-
dom students. In contrast to the two other papers, this paper focuses on boundaries
between local authorities, which perform many of the same functions as US school
districts. Therefore local authority actions that affect achievement gain are captured in
the estimates. Moreover, test score gain would appear to provide a better measure of
112school value-added than average test score.
Because of the absence of school attendance zones within local authorities, the au-
thors had to construct a method for measuring the quality of schooling associated with
each housing unit. They used the empirical distribution of school attendance to deﬁne a
set of overlapping school attendance zone boundaries, meaning that many houses were
located in more than one attendance zone. Subsequently school characteristics were
computed for each house as a weighted average of the initial test score and test score
gain for schools in all the relevant attendance zones.
A concern about this approach to measuring school quality is the fact that families
are assumed to respond to the same test score and gain information that their actual
location decisions help to determine (for example through peer effects). This problem
holds for all the papers using test score information and relates to the aforementioned
possibility that test scores capture differences in unobserved quality of neighbours or
neighbourhood amenities. It is quite difﬁcult to distinguish whether 1) test score differ-
ences reﬂect differences in school quality; 2) test score differences result from sorting
on the basis of school reputations; and 3) test score differences result from sorting on
the basis of other amenities including the characteristics of residents. In fact each of
these channels could contribute to test score differences across boundaries.
The use of measures of school quality less directly related to family characterist-
ics would mitigate this problem, but input measures historically explain little of the
variation in school effectiveness. The estimation of school value added controlling
for observed and unobserved student heterogeneity would provide a better measure of
school quality with which to estimate the capitalisation of school effectiveness into
housing prices.
1135.6 Estimationofthe EffectsofCompetition, Choice, andAccount-
ability
Recent expansions in public school choice and the growth of accountability systems
in many countries have altered the public school environment, but the effects of such
programs have proven elusive to estimate because of both the manner in which the
programs have been introduced and the difﬁculty accounting for student and family
heterogeneity related to different choices. A number of methods have been used to
identify choice and accountability effects, including instrumental variables, difference-
in-differences and lottery outcomes as instruments for school enrolment. Table 5
provides examples of three of these methods used in studies of choice and accountabil-
ity. The study of catholic-public school quality differences by Neal (1997), the study of
accountability system effects on achievement by Hanushek and Raymond (2005), and
the investigation of open enrolment effects by Cullen, Jacob and Levitt (2006) provide
examples of these three methods.
The endogeneity of the decision to attend private school introduces a difference
between students in public and private school that biases estimates of sector differences
in quality unless the unobserved heterogeneity is fully accounted for. Consider the
following two equation model. In the ﬁrst equation achievement A is a function of
a school sector indicator variable P (equal to 1 for catholic school and 0 for public
school), a vector of family and community characteristics X, and an error u. In the
second equation the unobserved propensity to attend private school P∗ is a function of
a vector of family and community characteristics Z and an error e. If P∗ > 1 students
attend catholic school and P = 1; otherwise students attend public school and P=0.
Ai = Piδ +Xiβ +ui
P∗
i = Ziγ +ei
(75)
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































115OLS estimation of the top equation is likely to produce an upward biased estimate
of δ and overstate the catholic school-public school quality differential because the
expected value of the error u is likely to be higher for students attending private school.
A solution to this problem is the identiﬁcation of an instrument that belongs in Z but
not X, i.e. affects the probability of attending private school but otherwise does not
affect achievement.60
Neal (1997) argues that catholic church adherents as a share of the county pop-
ulation and the number of catholic secondary schools per square mile provide valid
instruments for the estimation of δ, because they affect the money (ﬁrst instrument) or
time (second instrument) costs of attending catholic school but are otherwise unrelated
to A. Although religious afﬁliation may be a stronger predictor of catholic school at-
tendance, Neal argues that it is not a valid instrument because of the possibility that it is
directly related to achievement. For example, families may choose to become catholic
in order to send a child to a catholic school.
The argument that personal religious afﬁliation is likely related to confounding
factors while the county mean share of individuals with a particular religious afﬁliation
is not related to those factors appears tenuous, as it seems likely that students in more
heavily catholic counties with more catholic schools per square mile are more likely to
have family backgrounds and even tastes similar to the average catholic. This would
introduce a non-zero correlation between these instruments and u and bias estimates of
δ. Moreover, the share of Catholics in the county population and number of catholic
schools may be directly related to the quality of public schools by affecting both the
level of tax support for the public schools and the involvement of community members
in public school affairs. Such a correlation would also introduce an upward bias into
the estimate catholic-public school gap.
FinallyasNealpointsout, thisapproachreliesontheassumptionthattheresidential
choice is exogenous with respect to the quality of public and catholic schools. Given
60See Heckman (1979) for a comprehensive treatment of non-random selection.
116the previously discussed evidence that families appear to sort partly on the basis of
preferences regarding education, this assumption may well be violated. If the choice is
between living in School District A and attending catholic school and living in School
District B and attending public school, county composition is likely to be related to the
quality of the public schools. The fact that the instrument is measured at the county
level and inclusion of a number of demographic characteristics likely mitigate the po-
tentially problematic impact of sorting, though many metropolitan areas include mul-
tiple counties and demographic variables may not capture salient differences among
families and communities.
In terms of interpretation, this IV approach rules out consideration of general equi-
librium effects of the presence of catholic schools affecting the quality of local public
schools either through competitive pressures or ﬁnancial support. Rather it identiﬁes
the race speciﬁc average catholic-public school difference in school value-added based
on county differences in catholic religiosity. Given housing constraints faced by blacks
in many metropolitan areas during the late 1970s, these arguments justifying the em-
pirical approach seem stronger for blacks than for whites.
Cullen, Jacob and Levitt (2006) investigate choice entirely within a single public
school district (open enrolment) through comparisons of lottery winners and losers.
The use of lottery outcomes circumvents problems introduced by the fact that those
who apply to non-neighbourhood schools differ from non-applicants and winners who
decide to accept admission differ from those who decide not to accept admission.
Estimation of the following OLS speciﬁcation generates estimates of the beneﬁts
of open enrolment:
Aia =Win_Lotteryiaδ +LotteryaΓ++Xiβ +uia (76)
where Win_Lottery is a dummy variable equal to 1 if application a for student i was
a lottery winner and Lottery is vector of lottery ﬁxed effects that indicates to which
117lottery the observation refers (there are 194 different lotteries, and students may parti-
cipate in more than one). In this model the estimate of δ is the weighted average of the
regression adjusted difference in mean outcomes for winners and losers of the various
lotteries. In the absence of selective attrition from the sample or contamination of the
lotteries the lotteries produce an unbiased estimate of δ.
The possibility of participating in multiple lotteries and not attend a lottery school
even if you win the lottery affects the interpretation of δ. Choosing to participate in
more lotteries raises the probability of winning and the probability of not attending a
particular lottery school even if you win that lottery. If the treatment is deﬁned as the
average effect of attending the lottery school, the estimate of δ captures the intention to
treat effect on applicants. The authors also provide an alternative explanation: the aver-
age impact of having a school in the choice set for students who expressed an interest.
Note that as the number of choices and lotteries per-student rise, one would expect a
decrease in the beneﬁt to winning as fewer students would take up the opportunity to
attend the lottery school and the next-best alternative for losers would tend to be closer
in expected match quality to the lottery school.
Importantly, this and other lottery based analyses provide no information on either
the general equilibrium effects of choice on the overall distribution of school quality or
the speciﬁc factors that account for any positive or negative effects. Because the lottery
analyses compare the outcomes of winners and losers, the estimates ignore any district
wide increases or decreases in school quality. In terms of the sources of any differences
between those attending non-neighbourhood and neighbourhood schools, the lotteries
do not provide information on the contributions of teachers, facilities, curriculum, or
peers.
The limitations of lottery based analyses in terms of public policy are perhaps most
severe in cases where the set of lottery school spaces is small relative to the total num-
ber of students. The fact that participants in such lotteries are a selective sample means
118that students in schools made up entirely of lottery winners will also constitute a select-
ive group. Consequently a ﬁnding that winners of lotteries to charter or private schools
outperform the losers who end up primarily at neighbourhood schools could be driven
entirely by differences in the peer composition. If that is the case, program expansion
would tend to diminish the average beneﬁts to lottery winners as the lottery sample be-
came less select, and the beneﬁts of attending a charter or private school would decline
to zero if all students were to attend such schools.
Hanushek and Raymond (2005) use a difference in differences framework to ana-
lyse the effect of accountability on the level and distribution of achievement. In con-
trast to school choice analyses where endogenous decisions on the part of families
complicate the estimation, empirical studies of accountability effects must address is-
sues related to the political decision to adopt an accountability regime at a particular
time. Adoption affects all districts in a state, and it is likely that adoption is related
to other contemporaneous policy changes such as a decision to add resources that also
affect outcomes. Identiﬁcation of accountability effects requires the construction of
valid counterfactuals for accountability regimes.
Equation 77 describes state average achievement (A) in year y as a function of an
indicator for an accountability regime C, a vector of a characteristics X that vary by
state and year, and a composite error that includes a year effect α, a state effect τ and
random term ε that varies by state and year.
Asy =Csyδ +Xsyβ +αy+τs+εsy (77)
Consider the following four possible estimators of the accountability effect. The
ﬁrst uses cross-sectional data for a single year, and identiﬁes the accountability effect
asthemeanachievementdifferencebetweenstateswithandwithoutaccountabilitysys-
tems. Clearly myriad differences among states would introduce a correlation between
C and τ and contaminate the estimate.
119The second uses time-series data for a single state that implemented an accountab-
ility system during the sample period. This method identiﬁes the accountability effect
as the mean achievement difference between periods following adoption and periods
prior to adoption. In this case, any changes over time would confound the estimated
accountability effect by introducing a correlation between C and α.
Thethirdmethodusespaneldataonstatesandastateandyearﬁxedeffectsspeciﬁc-
ation with a dummy variable for whether or not a state has an accountability program
in year y. The ﬁxed effects explicitly account for differences among states common
to all years τ and all differences among years common to all states α. Identiﬁcation
relies on the assumption that changes over time in states that do not change account-
ability status provide a valid counterfactual estimate of what would have occurred in
states that transition to an accountability system. This assumption that the covariance
between C and ε equals zero would be violated if adoption of an accountability system
were correlated with other changes that affect educational outcomes, perhaps including
changes in the political system, economic circumstances, etc.
The fourth method used by Hanushek and Raymond adds a state speciﬁc time trend
to account for state speciﬁc changes over time that could bias estimates of δ; the pa-
per also measures accountability by the share of the previous four years covered by
an accountability system. In this framework the accountability effect is identiﬁed by
within-state deviations from the time trend related to the adoption of an accountability
system and differences in the timing of accountability adoption across states. Although
the addition of a state-speciﬁc time trend controls for trends over time that could con-
found the estimates, it does not account for discontinuous time-varying factors include
those related to the decision to enact an accountability structure. Even with long time
series and polynomial trends the possibility remains that accountability program adop-
tion would not be the only factor contributing to a discontinuous change in achievement
around the time of program adoption.
120Interpretation is complicated by a number of factors including heterogeneity in
accountability programs, uncertainties in the time pattern of effects following pro-
gram adoption, and the extent to which the adoption of accountability programs led
to changes in other factors that affect achievement including the amount of resources
devoted to education. Hanushek and Raymond control for school spending, but to the
extent that accountability increases the return on investments in education, the mag-
nitude of the effect varies with school spending. Therefore a speciﬁcation that restricts
the effect to be constant when it is in fact inter-woven with the level of spending will
provide an incomplete picture of the overall effects. In addition, the long run effects
may include any impact on the quality and distribution of the stock of teachers, while
effects in the short run operate largely through other mechanisms.
6 Conclusions
Estimation of the return to schooling or school input effects must account for the com-
plications introduced by the myriad choices made by families, teachers, administrat-
ors, politicians, judges, or other actors. Approaches to estimation range from structural
models derived explicitly from theory to experimental and quasi-experimental meth-
ods based on randomised trials, rule changes, policy changes, lotteries or other source
of variation. Although these methods may appear as almost polar opposites in terms
of their reliance on theory and explicit assumptions about behaviour, closer inspec-
tion says otherwise. Rather conditions for identiﬁcation and parameter interpretation
in most cases require assumptions about some aspects of the underlying choice frame-
work. Importantly, such assumptions appear to take on greater importance as the mod-
els become more ﬂexible and comprehensive. As we highlight in Part 1, identiﬁcation
of the return to schooling in models that allow for heterogeneous returns and mul-
tiple dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity require assumptions about the processes
121underlying the choice of schooling level. Similarly, efforts to estimate differences in
teacher quality require assumptions regarding the mechanisms through which teachers
and students are matched. In addition, they also require assumptions about the beha-
viourofparentsinresponsetoobservedinstructionalqualityinordertoidentifyteacher
effects on learning. The proliferation of elementary and secondary school administrat-
ive data facilitates the use of panel data methods that can account for confounding
factors introduced by purposeful choices. Moreover, the linking of these data with
information on wages, involvement in the criminal justice system, and vital statistics
will enable researchers to follow children from birth to adulthood. This expands the
range of questions that can be addressed but also introduces additional choices and
behaviours that must be accounted for. More complicated conceptual and empirical
models will be required to identify treatment effects in these settings. Although there
are many directions to expand and improve upon existing work, four speciﬁc areas
come to mind based upon existing ﬁndings and recent methodological developments.
The ﬁrst is improved treatment of individual heterogeneity along multiple dimensions
including non-cognitive skills; the second is the incorporation of endogenous parental
responses into estimates of school input effects or teacher quality; the third is an en-
hanced understanding of the linkages among school and teacher effects across years
and classrooms including the effects of heterogeneity in preparation on the distribution
of teacher effort and learning; and the fourth is a greater integration of differences in
school quality into models of education choice and the returns to schooling. In terms
of the fourth, access to elementary and secondary school quality may be an import-
ant determinant of heterogeneous returns to schooling and differences in education
choices, and the incorporation of such differences would enhance our understanding of
the ways in which various policy changes that alter schooling choices are likely to af-
fect the distribution of achievement, academic attainment, and future earnings. Serious
progress along these dimensions is likely to require additional data on the years prior to
122kindergarten entry, individual skills and behaviours, the allocation of academic support
within schools, and parental time and ﬁnancial support for learning. The combining of
administrative and survey data sets would appear to be a particularly promising way
of building a data set with the elements necessary to gain a much better understanding
of the distribution of teacher and school effects and the underlying choice frameworks
that contribute to the distribution of achievement and future earnings.
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